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5Key findings
Key findings 
In addition to these fields of action, which are relevant both 
for the EU and for individual member states, industrial  
policy measures in the following three areas could be useful 
for Germany. In particular:
• Improvement of framework conditions for research  
and development 
• Gearing the education and research system more 
strongly towards entrepreneurship and innovation 
• State as a pioneer and trailblazer in new technologies 
In their implementation, however, strategic European and 
German industrial policies face a trade-off between the 
protection and promotion of legitimate self-interests on 
the one hand and the defense against economically dam-
aging protectionism and ill-considered state interven-
tionism on the other. The so-called “mission orientation” 
can make a significant contribution here: Accordingly, 
industrial policy should serve to address specific societal  
challenges (e. g. globalization, digitization, demographic 
change, climate change) and be coherently targeted  
towards these objectives. Furthermore, industrial policy  
is to be driven in parallel by different actors. Above all, it 
is a joint task of business and politics to enable a competi-
tive business location where the state ensures good com-
petition-promoting framework conditions and the private 
actors implement concrete actions. 
Technological innovations are essential drivers of long-
term and sustainable growth. Accordingly, there currently 
is a debate in Germany and the EU as to whether a new, 
strategic industrial policy can be an answer to the complex 
dynamics of digitization. Products of this discussion are,  
for example, the Industrial Strategy 2030 published by  
the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy  
in November 2019 and the Franco-German Manifesto for a  
European Industrial Policy for the 21st Century. The focus here 
is on the question of how the EU and its member states  
can maintain their innovative and thus competitive ability  
in the face of diverse challenges. However, there is no 
standard recipe for building and expanding the innovative  
capacity of an economy. Different countries rely on differ-
ent strategies that can be equally successful. An important  
distinguishing feature is the role of the state. A clear  
example of divergent innovation models are China and the 
USA. Although both countries have completely different 
approaches to an innovation-promoting industrial policy, 
both models are characterized by major technological  
successes. With an analysis of the Chinese and American 
innovation system, this study highlights the main features 
and success factors of both innovation models and discusses  
whether and to what extent these factors are transferable to 
the European and German case. 
Five fields of action for an innovation-promoting industrial 
policy in the EU and Germany emerge from this analysis 
• Implementation of a long-term innovation strategy
• Expansion of venture capital
• Expansion of cluster approaches at EU level
• Thinking and strengthening of cybersecurity at EU level
• Creation of uniform and fair conditions for competition 
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Especially in the case of these basic technologies, which are 
central to growth and economic dynamics and take 10 to 
20 years to reach market maturity, companies are unwilling 
and unable to carry out the necessary innovations due to 
the high level of uncertainty regarding potential economic 
success (Mazzucato 2013; Petersen 2015). 
In light of this, there is a strong case for an active state 
industrial policy aimed at maintaining the technological  
lead and thus the competitiveness of an economy in the 
long term. Nevertheless, industrial policy in Germany 
and the EU did not have a good reputation for a long time 
(Aghion et al. 2011; Gorning 2012) and still seems to cause 
great mistrust among economic experts (SVR 2019). This 
is also related to the fact that economic policy, especially 
from the 1980s onwards, was primarily market-liberal in 
orientation, as shaped by the presidencies of Ronald Reagan 
and Margaret Thatcher. Structural changes in the economy 
should be driven by market forces and the state should pri-
marily assume a “night watchman” role. This was accom-
panied by increasing deregulation of the financial markets,  
which at least proportionately laid the foundations for 
coming economic crises (Huffschmid 2005). The global 
financial and economic crisis of 2007/2008 was the main 
reason why industrial policy in Germany regained (some) 
respectability. This is because the effects of the crisis were 
cushioned by state interventions such as “short-time 
work”, the “scrappage premium” or the “bank bailout” 
(Gorning 2012). By now, there is hence a strong tendency  
to focus no longer on the question of whether industrial 
policy should take place at all, but rather on what industrial 
policy should look like in the 21st century (Rehfeld and 
Dankbaar 2015; Bardt 2019). This also includes dealing  
with increasingly complex value chains that go far beyond 
traditional trade relations and, closely related to this,  
the question of the future competitiveness of business  
locations.
1 Introduction: Industrial policy regains 
respectability
The sense and usefulness of industrial policy is controver-
sial in business, science and politics. Generally speaking,  
industrial policy is defined as “all economic policy meas-
ures and endeavors by the federal government, the federal 
states and local authorities and associations which influ-
ence the structure and development of industry” (Gabler 
1988, p. 2.523). Opponents of such measures generally see 
industrial policy as a “history of failures” (Handelsblatt 
2012). One point of criticism is that the state does not have 
enough information to make the necessary and meaning- 
ful decisions for the development of the economy. Espe-
cially when governments try to identify individual “pick- 
ing the winner” companies or sectors, they run the risk  
of becoming the plaything of private sector's special inter-
ests – to the detriment of the national economy and tax-
payers (Donges 2005; Scheel 2005; Rehfeld and Dankbaar 
2015). According to this, the state should generally leave it 
to companies to “discover and implement the industries of 
the future and cutting-edge technologies of the 21st cen-
tury in the course of the innovation competition” (Donges 
2005, p. 6). A second much-discussed aspect is the question 
of the relationship between the state and the market:  
This is because the term “industrial policy” carries the 
associ ation that the state is attacking the principles of  
free competition through inappropriate intervention 
(Wirtschaftswoche 2018; Dohse et al. 2019).
Proponents of an active industrial policy, on the other 
hand, point out that the economic rise of the Western 
industrialized countries since the middle of the 19th cen-
tury would not have been possible without one. In addition,  
in the 20th century Asian countries such as Japan, South 
Korea and now China are examples of successful state 
industrial policy (Aghion et al. 2011; Rodrik 2017; Stiglitz 
2017) – although there are also some critical voices regard-
ing these countries (Barwick et al. 2019; Lane 2019; Pons- 
Benaiges 2017). Mariana Mazzucato (2013) believes that not  
only has government funded the riskiest research, whether 
applied or basic, but it has indeed often been the source  
of the most radical, path-breaking types of innovation.  
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This debate is fueled by the policy-making of the acting  
US President Donald Trump. On the one hand, this consists 
of aggressive rhetoric and Twitter messages, but on the 
other hand it also leads to concrete economic policy meas-
ures, such as punitive tariffs and tax breaks. True to the 
motto America First, they clearly demonstrate that industrial 
poli cy and one-sided lobbying are close to each other – to 
the potential detriment of international economic relations. 
Dani Rodrik (2017) even describes Trump’s political style  
as “defective industrial policy”. For Rodrik, industrial  
policy in a democracy requires transparency, reliability  
and institutionalization, as well as a careful calibration  
of relations between government and private enterprise.  
“Industrial policy à la Trump” does not meet these demands, 
but oscillates between nepotism and intimidation attempts. 
From a German and European point of view, the USA under 
Trump thus seems ready to turn its back on the world eco-
nomic order that it helped to establish after the Second 
World War. The world economic order aimed to reduce eco-
nomic barriers and avoid unilateral protectionist measures. 
At present, however, the USA is breaking away as a reliable  
partner in international political and economic cooperation. 
The traditionally good transatlantic relations will thus be 
put to a severe test (Jungbluth 2017, pp. 6-7). In light of 
this, the question arises for Germany and Europe as to what 
measures might be appropriate as a reaction without falling 
victim to a “defective industrial policy”.
On the other hand, Trump’s approach is opposed to China’s 
economic rise. This takes place under frequently criticized 
framework conditions, but is characterized by a thoroughly 
successful industrial policy – all in all to the benefit of the  
global economy. Among developing and emerging countries,  
the Chinese way is now regarded as a model and possible 
alternative to the Western democratic, but also market- 
liberal development model (Aghion et al. 2011, p. 2). This 
resurgent “competition of systems” is a major challenge 
for the industrialized countries, which has increased sig-
nificantly since Xi Jinping took office (MERICS 2017; Stahl 
2017). For Western scientists like Sebastian Heilmann, the 
19th Party Congress of the KPCh, which took place in Octo-
ber 2017, marked a turning point: This had been the “entry 
into an open systemic competition between China and the 
market-based democracies of the West” (MERICS 2017). 
The political dimension of China’s rise is thus taking on a 
new dimension, requiring a readjustment of relations with 
China. In this process, too, a sense of proportion is needed 
to maintain the tightrope walk between protectionism and 
the protection of legitimate national interests. 
In the area of tension between this new constellation  
in the West and the East, Germany and the EU must also  
deal with the effects and the design of the fourth industrial  
revolution (digitization). The digitization of almost all areas 
of life creates new foundations for international competi-
tiveness. Traditional competitive advantages, technologies  
and business models are becoming obsolete. New ones are 
emerging at a speed that far exceeds the three previous  
industrial revolutions (mechanization, automation, infor-
matization) (Schwab 2016). China also wants to take 
advantage of the opportunities this creates and no longer 
just act as a supplier for Western companies. In the 21st 
century, China wants to move to the technological fore-
front of the world and set standards – and moving from 
being the “factory of the world” to becoming the “research 
labora tory of the world” (Jungbluth 2015, p. 85). For West-
ern industrialized countries, which have been leaders in 
certain technologies up to now, these developments include 
far-reaching challenges: For them, the risk appears to be 
particularly high of being overtaken and left behind by the 
fourth industrial revolution of emerging countries such as 
China, which are consistently relying on new technologies, 
flanked by industrial policy (Petersen and Jungbluth 2018, 
p. 144–145). The transition from the combustion engine  
to alternative drive technologies could become a warning  
example of this. This also changes the conditions for an 
industrial policy: More and more, the question arises how 
this can be designed in such a way that the innovative 
capacity of an economy is optimally promoted and thus 
its international competitiveness in the age of digitization 
is also guaranteed. Innovation policy should therefore be 
placed at the heart of industrial policy (Aiginger 2019; see 
also: BDI 2019, p. 3; SVR 2019, p. 141). 
In contrast, a proposal by the Federal Ministry for Eco-
nomic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) for a National Industrial  
Strategy 2030, which called for the development of national 
and European champions (BMWi 2019a), was criticized 
from several sides (Manager Magazin 2019). Instead, a 
horizontal approach or a balanced company size structure 
should be advocated (BDI 2019, SVR 2019). The revised  
version, Industrial Strategy 2030, accordingly departed 
noticeably from the very concrete plans of national and 
European champions (BMWi 2019b). 
In light of this, the present GED Focus Paper gives in  
Chapter 2 a short overview of industrial policy approaches 
in the USA, China, the EU and Germany. Chapter 3 classifies 
the topic of “innovation as a field of action for industrial 
policy”, which plays an important role in view of the next 
industrial revolution. In Chapter 4, we examine whether 
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and what Germany or Europe can learn from China and the 
USA with regard to an innovation-promoting industrial 
policy. We then make proposals as to which areas of action 
and policies could be addressed in the EU and Germany.  
Chapter 4 incorporates the results of a Bertelsmann 
Stiftung workshop on industrial policy held in Berlin  
on July 4, 2019.1
1 At this point we would like to thank them by name for their valuable  
and helpful contributions: Sarah Blanck and Dr Han Wei Chung  
(Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy); Niklas Garnadt (German 
Council of Economic Experts); Dr Lea Shih (University of Trier).
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2 General guidelines for industrial policy 
2.1 USA
The progressive transition from an industrial to a ser-
vice and knowledge society can also be seen in the USA. 
The share of the economic output of the industrial sector in 
1970 was still 32 percent of total economic output, in 2016 
it was only 19 per cent (UNCTAD 2019a). However, Ameri-
can industry plays a fundamental role in the country’s 
exports of goods and employment. Its share of economic 
output at 3.62 trillion US dollars was generated by 20 mil-
lion American employees or 13 percent of the working  
population and corresponds to 63.5 percent of American 
merchandise exports (USBLS 2017; World Bank 2018). 
Although the trend towards a decline in industrial pro-
duction has by no means affected all sectors equally 
(Ramaswamy et al. 2017) and even recorded a slight 
upswing overall in recent years (West and Lansang 2018), 
the share of industrial production in the USA in total world 
industrial production is overall declining. While it was still 
at 28 percent in 2002, by 2016 it accounted for only 18 per-
cent. In 2010, the USA therefore had to relinquish the “title”  
as the world’s largest industrial nation – understood as the 
economy with the largest industrial production – to China 
(Levinson 2018).
History, aims and means
Economic or industrial policy conducted in a liberal  
market economy plays generally a reserved role (Hall and 
Soskice 2001). Even if this image is readily maintained in 
official political communication, it is not consistent with 
the importance of industrial policy for the success of the 
American economy (Wade 2014). Although the USA as a 
federal system is characterized more by an unfocussed and 
decentralized approach to industrial policy (Schrank and 
Whitford 2009), it has benefited greatly from an active role 
of the state, especially in the development of new and  
strategic technologies (Block and Keller 2011; Mazzucato 
2013). This strong influence can be traced back to the early 
Industrial policy plays a role in all economies, regardless  
of their economic system. Depending on the stage of devel-
opment and the political environment, the focus is more 
on an active (shaping the economic structure) or a passive 
industrial policy (maintaining the economic structure). In 
recent years, strategic industrial policy has developed into 
another field of industrial policy action: This involves the 
targeted promotion and expansion of promising sectors, 
e. g. in the high technology sector (Oberender et al. 2013; 
Klodt 2018). This topic has become increasingly important  
in Western industrialized countries, especially against the 
background of China’s economic rise and the increasing 
internationalization of Chinese companies. The main focus 
is on maintaining the competitiveness of these economies 
and their companies in the face of growing Chinese compe-
tition, which stems from a strongly industrial policy-driven 
economic environment and targeted state support. 
Moreover, the inauguration of US President Donald Trump 
led to a remarkable change in the design of international  
economic policy away from multilaterally influenced 
approaches towards protectionism and the overemphasis on 
national interests. The trade disputes between the USA and 
China and between the USA and the EU have already shown 
that protectionist industrial policy instruments such as 
customs duties are increasingly being used in trade policy,  
making international cooperation much more difficult. 
The current industrial policy discussion also revolves 
around the question of whether strategic industrial policy 
is necessary and appropriate to balance out unfair compe-
tition conditions and to establish a level playing field inter-
nationally, where the same rules apply to all companies 
involved and cooperation between countries on an equal 
footing is possible. 
In the following, we will first of all look at the general 
principles of industrial policy that can be identified in the 
USA, China, the EU and Germany as well as the role strate-
gic industrial policy already plays.
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himself among his core electorate in the industrialized and 
electorally very important “Rust Belt” states in the north-
east of the country.
In regard to funding the government has mainly focused 
on tax concessions. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, which 
it played a key role in driving forward, is intended to make 
the American industry more competitive again internation-
ally. However, in accordance with his strongly transactional 
basic understanding, the President does not hesitate to 
give the stick if the carrot approach does not bear fruit. For 
example, he loudly criticized General Motors for wanting 
to cut several thousand jobs in the USA despite massive tax 
breaks. As a consequence, he threatened to cut all subsidies 
to the company (Horsley 2018) – but to this day he has not 
followed up these words with action.
In addition, the Trump administration also revived meas-
ures that its predecessors had largely shied away from. 
Quite openly, the President has personally committed  
himself to using not only non-tariff but also tariff meas-
ures to protect American industry (Twitter quote: “I am a 
Tariff Man.”). The extensive measures taken against over 
800 Chinese goods provoked a trade war between the two 
great powers (Lawder and Blanchard 2018). In the view of 
the Trump government, these tariffs are urgently needed 
to put a stop to unfair trade practices, as these challenge 
the competitiveness of the US in the long term (The White 
House 2018; Slobodian 2018).
The U.S. government is emphatically proactive in its  
America First Policy, including in international trade agree-
ments. In their opinion, the USA is too often on the losing 
side of poorly negotiated trade agreements. The govern-
ment is therefore exerting massive pressure to adapt  
existing agreements (e. g. the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, which has already been renegotiated), or is  
very skeptical and hostile to new agreements or to agree-
ments still in the negotiation process (Partington 2018). 
Predecessor governments, on the other hand, emphasized 
the increasing sales opportunities for American industry 
and the profits for all countries involved through further 
liberalization of markets. 
Even before or early in the Trump administration, some 
experts anticipated a corresponding change and tightening 
of American industrial policy with negative consequences 
for the United States and the world economy. As mentioned 
above, the economist Dani Rodrik (2017) spoke quite openly 
of a “defective industrial policy”. Three years after Trump’s 
inauguration, a long-term assessment of the possible con-
years of the USA and has been prominent throughout its 
history (Stensrud 2016). 
With the government of Ronald Reagan, the latest phase of 
American industrial policy begins, which is characterized by 
the targeted promotion of strategically important industries 
(Stensrud 2016). Here are some recent examples:
• Provision of capital: Business start-ups as well as small 
and medium-sized enterprises benefit from the fact that 
various federal authorities maintain programs for the 
provision of risk capital. You can also apply for loans 
from the Small Business Administration. 
• Tax advantage: Larger companies or multinational  
corporations are supported by the American government, 
primarily through tax breaks. At the state level, there  
has been competition for the most favorable business  
environment. 
• Preferential treatment in public procurement: Although the 
USA is a member of the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement, it is largely free to define the extent of 
opening up to foreign suppliers. The American defense 
industry in particular is benefiting from this.
• Export promotion: The Export-Import Bank of the United 
States primarily supports small and medium-sized  
companies in their economic expansion abroad. Almost 
half of the loans, guarantees and insurance services  
it provides, go to the American aviation industry  
(Export-Import Bank of the United States 2018). 
• Industry and corporate rescue: In the wake of the eco-
nomic and financial crisis, Barack Obama signed the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act briefly after his 
inauguration in 2009. In addition, the American gov-
ernment became a major shareholder in the automobile 
groups Chrysler and General Motors. 
Industrial policy under the Trump government
Whereas the previous administration of Barack Obama  
was primarily concerned with promoting the innovative 
capacity of the American economy with its industrial policy  
(Sperling 2013), the Trump administration officially focuses 
on national defense capabilities (Navarro 2018). Accordingly, 
the President commissioned a comprehensive report from 
an inter-ministerial working group to identify the indus-
trial sectors and capacities that are essential for national 
security. Among other things, the report recommends the 
development of a National Advanced Manufacturing Strategy 
and higher targeted government investment or subsidies in 
critical sectors (United States Interagency Task Force 2018). 
Thereby, President Trump will be able to make a name for 
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sequences of the government’s industrial policy is not yet 
possible, but the undermining of the regional or global 
trade order and the erratic and aggressive behavior of the 
government significantly increase the already high level  
of political uncertainty worldwide (Petersen 2019).
2.2 China
China has undergone a unique development in recent his-
tory: from a relatively poor country in the late 1970s to the 
second largest economy in the world. Between 1978 and 
2017, China’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew by a  
factor of 225 from 367.9 billion RMB to 82.7 trillion RMB 
(NBS 2018). Today China is the “factory of the world”  
in terms of industrial production and a serious new com-
petitor for the industrial countries. 
Although China is also on the way to becoming a service 
society, industry continues to play a decisive role in eco-
nomic performance: In 2017, it contributed about 40 per-
cent to GDP and 28 percent to employment (NBS 2018). 
Moreover, 40.5 percent of the gross value added of the  
Chinese economy is linked to industry (World Bank 2019a). 
The role of industry in foreign trade is even more impor-
tant: 94 percent of Chinese exports in 2017 came from the 
manufacturing sector (UNCTAD 2018). This means that 
China is still heavily dependent on industrial exports, even 
though the Chinese government has been pursuing the goal 
of reducing these dependencies at least since the financial 
crisis. 
History, aims and means
Industrial policy played a decisive role in China’s develop-
ment from an imperative planned economy to a “market  
economy with Chinese characteristics”. In the 7th Five-
Year Plan (1986-1990), it was already named as an official 
reform instrument (Heilmann and Shih 2013, p. 10). The 
“East Asian economic miracle”, i. e. the rise of Japan and 
South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s, had a considerable  
influence on the development of Chinese industrial policy.  
In particular Japan2 played a major role in this respect 
(Jiang and Li 2018). Japan’s catching-up process vis-à-vis 
the industrialized countries was regarded by China’s reform 
politicians as a possible model for their own development 
process. 
2 The orientation towards Japan was so great that even the Chinese 
term for industrial policy, chanye zhengce, was borrowed from  
Japanese (Heilmann and Shih 2013, p. 7).
It was not until the Hu Wen government and its admin-
istrative reforms of 2003 that industrial policy in China 
achieved a breakthrough (Heilmann and Shih 2013, 
pp. 12-14). Since then, the main responsibility has been 
with the National Development and Reform Commission, which 
took over important powers from its predecessor, the State 
Planning Commission (e. g. on pricing in many sectors) and 
has considerable formative power. Other actors are the 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, which was 
established in 2008, and sector-specific ministries. The 
Chinese government subsequently published a large num-
ber of industrial policy sectoral and cross-sectoral pro-
grams and measures (Heilmann and Shih 2013, p. 13; 
Meissner 2016, p. 348). 
China’s industrial policy was refocused after the financial  
crisis: The development and promotion of new sectors and 
technologies came to the foreground. This was combined 
with an increasing promotion of expenditure on research 
and development (R & D) and a clear focus on “independent 
innovation” (zizhu chuangxin). As early as 2010, the State 
Council defined seven of these new sectors, which are also 
reflected in the industrial policy strategy Made in China 2025 
(MIC2025), which was announced in 2015 and is the sub-
ject of controversial discussion abroad, including renewable 
energies, cars with alternative drive systems and mechan-
ical engineering in the premium segment. The state there-
fore plays a key role in selecting and guiding technological 
development. The following instruments are at its disposal  
for this purpose (Meissner 2016, p. 346; Jiang and Li 2018):
• Approval of investments
• Regulation of market access
• Catalogs for controlling investments
• Taxes and subsidies
• Lending
• Allocation of land use rights
• Public procurement (influencing demand) 
Until Xi Jinping took office in 2013, China developed a  
comprehensive system of selective industrial policy on  
this basis, with some special features: Not only are certain 
sectors promoted or restricted, but also certain technologi-
cal road maps (jishu luxian), certain products and certain 
companies (Jiang and Li 2018). A further characteristic of 
Chinese industrial policy, which is often critized by foreign 
actors, is the systematic discrimination of foreign compa-
nies in China. Examples of this are access to public pro-
curement or the obligation to set up joint ventures in  
certain sectors (Jungbluth 2015, p. 81; Meissner 2016, 
p. 350).
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development of the global industrial sector” (State Council  
of the People’s Republic of China 2015a). MIC2025 specifi-
cally states ten key industries in which China aims to 
become a global technology and innovation leader by 2049: 
• New generation of information technologies3
• Machines with computer-aided numerical control (CNC) 
in the premium segment3 and robots 
• Aerospace systems
• Marine technology systems and high-tech ships 
• Advanced rail transport systems
• Energy-saving cars and cars with alternative drive  
technology3
• Energy systems3
• Agricultural machinery
• New materials3 
• Biomedicine3 and medical devices in the premium  
segment  
In the core areas that are central to these industries, China 
is to “expand its market share of its own intellectual prop-
erty rights [...] on a large scale, significantly reduce its 
dependence on foreign countries [...] and [...] reach a lead-
ing international level by 2025” (State Council of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China 2015a). However, this goal is not to 
be achieved by independent innovations alone. The targeted 
acquisition of know-how abroad is explicitly provided for 
in MIC2025. This is also the reason why reservations about 
Chinese company investments have increased considerably  
in Germany since the takeover of the robot manufacturer  
Kuka by the Chinese household appliance manufacturer 
Midea in 2016 (Jungbluth 2018, p. 8). In response, the  
Federal Government has already twice amended the Foreign 
Trade and Payments Ordinance. The aforementioned indus-
trial policy papers at German and EU level also show a clear 
reference to the future relation to China (Jungbluth 2019, 
pp. 38-39). 
 
2.3 European Union
Industry plays an essential role in the European single  
market. It produces about 80 percent of EU exports and 
provides over 30 million jobs (BMWi 2019c). As the future 
development of industry could be a decisive factor for long-
term growth and sustainable employment, the European 
Commission considers that “the main role of industrial 
policy at EU level is to proactively provide the right frame-
3 Already defined as a strategic sector by the State Council in 2010 
(Jiang and Li 2018).
Industrial policy under the Xi government
China is now increasingly reaching the limits of its export- 
oriented development model: The costs of production fac-
tors are constantly rising, so that investors are migrating to 
cheaper locations such as Vietnam. The role of supplier for 
international corporations leads to an unfavorable position 
in the global value chains. The dependence on technology 
from the industrialized countries is still high. At the same 
time, China is increasingly in direct competition with these 
countries. This is a politically sensitive aspect for the Chi-
nese government (Jungbluth 2015, pp. 77-85.). 
This is also reflected in China’s current approach to indus-
trial policy, which is becoming evident since the 18th Party 
Congress 2013: A central goal is to end China’s role as  
“factory of the world”. Instead, the country is to move 
up into the lucrative segments of global value chains 
and become the “research laboratory of the world”. The 
emphasis is placed even more strongly on an industrial 
innovation policy (chanye chuangxin zhengce) than before 
(Jiang and Li 2018). More innovation should also create 
more dynamism in China’s economic development. 
Moreover, China’s innovative capacity will be crucial for  
its future competitiveness, especially in direct competition  
with the industrialized countries. Large-scale support  
programs for R & D in China should contribute to this, as 
should targeted investments by Chinese companies abroad 
that acquire and develop important know-how. An impor-
tant measure in this respect is the establishment of an  
efficient National Innovation System. To this end, intellectual  
property rights are to be better protected, better conditions  
for basic research and technological innovation are to be 
created and talent promotion is to be expanded (Jiang and 
Li 2018). 
A general feature of politics under Xi Jinping is the strong 
centralization of political power in his person, a departure 
from the collective leadership style established and culti-
vated under the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao governments, 
and a stronger top-down approach to important decisions 
(Stephan and Alsabah 2017, pp. 4-5; Naughton 2018).  
This also applies to perhaps the most important industrial  
policy program adopted so far under Xi Jinping: MIC2025. 
With this paper, the Chinese government emphasizes state 
control of the economy and lays the foundations for all 
authorities to take the necessary measures to implement  
the strategy. It defines a clear objective: “By the 100th 
anniversary of the founding of the New China, we want to 
build our country into an industrial power that will lead the 
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work conditions for enterprise development and innovation 
in order to make the EU an attractive place for industrial 
investment and job creation” (COM 2007: 374). 
It is therefore the responsibility of the EU to ensure that the 
necessary conditions for the competitiveness of European 
industry are in place. For this reason, European industrial 
policy is primarily geared to this in accordance with Article 
173 TFEU (TFEU 2012),
• speeding up the adjustment of industry to structural 
changes,
• encouraging an environment favourable to initiative  
and to the development of undertakings throughout  
the Union, particularly small and medium-sized under-
takings, 
• encouraging an environment favourable to cooperation 
between undertakings,
• fostering better exploitation of the industrial potential  
of policies of innovation, research and technological 
development. 
Principles, history and goals
Although industrial policy has not always played a leading 
role, it has always been an important component of Euro-
pean economic policy (SVR 2019, p. 143). In the run-up to 
the founding of the EU, economic policy focused on the 
creation of a single market (European Parliament 2019). 
Industrial policy played a minor role and its implemen-
tation was limited to national ownership. However, the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 opened the way to an integrated 
industrial policy in the EU. 
In particular, Article 3. 1. (m) of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community (EC Treaty 1997) sets the objec-
tive of “strengthening of the competitiveness of Commu-
nity industry”. For this reason, European industrial policy 
began in the early 1990s to identify sectors with potential 
for competitiveness. 
Against the background of a high unemployment rate in 
most member states and increasing international competi-
tive pressure on the EU, the EU Council adopted “the objec-
tive [...] aim[ed] at accelerating the uptake of digital tech-
nologies across Europe and ensuring that all Europeans 
have the necessary skills to use them” (European Parlia-
ment 2000). This area should not only be able to achieve 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs, 
but also have greater social cohesion.
In the context of the Lisbon Strategy, the European Commis-
sion also called in 2005 for a more integrated approach to 
industrial policy (COM 2005: 474). This approach proposes 
an action program with the following objectives: 
• Making Europe more attractive to investors and workers
• Placing knowledge and innovation at the heart of  
European growth
• Developing strategies to enable businesses to create 
more and better jobs  
Sustainability has also played an important role in  
the development of European industrial policy, which, 
according to the Commission, “aims at the continuous 
improvement of the quality of life and well-being for  
present and future generations” (COM 2008a: 397).  
Therefore, since 2008, the European Commission has been 
integrating the dimension of sustainability and resource 
efficiency into industrial policy. This decision focuses on 
improving the energy and environmental performance of 
products, promoting their acceptance by consumers and 
securing the supply of raw materials (COM 2008a: 397; 
COM 2008b: 699). In addition, European industrial policy 
has over time turned towards strategic sectors that should 
contribute to the development of key technologies (COM 
2009: 512). 
The Lisbon Strategy was in turn replaced in March 2010 by 
the Europe 2020 Strategy – A strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth. The following four of the seven flag-
ship initiatives of this strategy are particularly important 
for a competitive EU industry: Innovation Union (COM 2010a: 
546); A Digital Agenda for Europe (COM 2010b: 245); An Inte-
grated Industrial Policy for the Globalization Era (COM 2010c: 
614) and An agenda for new skills and job opportunities (COM 
2010d: 682). 
In addition, the European Commission publishes com-
munications with priority action lines and work programs  
at irregular intervals. These focus, in particular, on far- 
reaching structural reforms and better coordinated policy  
measures in the member states (COM 2011: 642), sectors 
with high innovation potential (COM 2012: 582) and the 
promotion of the manufacturing sector (COM 2014: 14). In 
addition, a focus on a coherent internal market policy and 
effective European infrastructure (energy, transport and 
information networks) for goods and services attempts to 
attract new investments and create better economic frame-
work conditions (COM 2014: 14). 
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Current industrial policy in the EU
Nowadays, European industrial policy has a clear strategic 
component. The focus on maintaining competitiveness and 
promoting future technologies is much stronger than in 
the past. This is also shown by the current New Strategy for 
European Industrial Policy, which the Commission published 
in September 2017 (European Commission 2017).
The aim is to bring together all existing and new horizontal 
and sectoral initiatives and thus, according to former  
President of the European Commission Jean-Claude 
Juncker, help European companies “to stay or become the 
world’s number one in terms of innovation, digitization 
and decarbonisation” (European Commission 2017). Key 
elements of the new EU industrial policy strategy include:
• Strengthening cybersecurity
• Free cross-border data traffic (“common European data 
space”)
• New measures for recycling management
• Security of supply with regard to critical raw materials
• New proposals for clean, competitive and connected 
mobility
• Modernization of the legal framework for intellectual 
property
• Improving public procurement in the EU
• Extending the skills agenda to new key sectors  
(e. g. green technologies and renewable energy,  
manufacturing)
• Initiatives for a balanced and progressive trade policy
• European framework for the verification of security- 
related foreign direct investment 
Urgent topics such as improved internet security and the 
explicit further development of key technologies (e. g. 
autonomous driving) are thus comprehensively covered. 
However, the implementation of these measures in practice 
depends largely on the EU member states. For this reason, 
the Friends of Industry Conference has been an annual  
meeting of the responsible EU ministers since 2013 “for 
better coordination in central industrial policy issues” 
(BMWi 2019c). 
In addition, for some years now, the growing tension 
between the USA and China has led to calls for a more  
targeted EU industrial policy in some member states, 
including France and Germany. The question increasingly 
arises as to what extent the EU has to counter an erratic US 
policy in the West and a stronger China with a clear indus-
trial policy agenda in the East. 
Germany and France gave an initial response in February  
2019 with the Franco-German Manifesto for a European Indus-
trial Policy for the 21st Century – a first proposal for the future 
of an integrated European industrial policy. “Massive” 
investments in innovation, the readjustment of the Euro-
pean legal framework and the protection of European  
technologies and markets are at the forefront of this mani-
festo (BMWi 2019d). In concrete terms, both countries 
propose to pool financial resources to enable technology 
investment, promote breakthrough innovation and, above 
all, to enable Europe to take a leading role in the field of 
artificial intelligence. In terms of regulation, the mani-
festo focuses mainly on amending and updating the con-
trol of mergers. Although France and Germany stress the 
importance of free trade and multilateralism, their Mani-
festo calls for the protection of the internal market through 
stricter control of foreign direct investment, the creation 
of an effective reciprocity mechanism for public procure-
ment with third countries, and the modernization of the 
WTO rulebook to improve transparency and to combat more 
effectively trade-distorting practices, including excessive 
subsidies to industry. 
2.4 Germany
As the largest economy with one of the highest industrial  
shares in GDP, Germany plays a decisive role for European  
industry. The manufacturing industry provides around 
6.3 million jobs, a turnover of almost 1,900 billion euros 
and thus 27.6 percent of Germany’s gross value added 
(Statistisches Bundesamt 2018a, 2018b). In 2017, the auto-
motive industry with 425 billion euros, mechanical engi-
neering with 252 billion euros, the metal industry with 
223 billion euros and the chemical / pharmaceutical indus-
try with 196 billion euros were the top-selling industrial 
sectors in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2018a). These 
industries not only occupy a leading position in Germany, 
but also convince customers all over the world with their 
high quality standards Made in Germany. 
In comparison to other EU countries, industry in Germany 
is far more responsible for growth, prosperity and jobs. 
With a share of 86 percent, it is also the core of Germany’s 
export (World Bank 2018). The role of industry and indus-
trial policy is therefore of particular interest to Germany, 
not only at national but also at EU level. 
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• WG 3: Future of work in industry and industry-related 
services: How can the skilled workforce be secured in 
times of digitalization and demographic change and  
how must technological change be shaped so that oppor-
tunities can be exploited, and risks minimized in the 
working world of the future? 
• WG 4: Value creation structures of the future: What are 
the risks and opportunities of digitization for Germany?
• WG 5: International competitiveness of German indus-
try: How can the German and European framework con-
ditions be improved to strengthen the international 
competitiveness of German industry?  
In addition, six concrete guidelines and demands are the 
Alliance’s first results: 
• Strengthening global competitiveness through  
innovation and investment
• Creating an energy union and exploiting potential for 
energy efficiency
• Achieving global commitment in climate policy
• Setting sustainable framework conditions for a  
successful European automotive industry
• Fostering a digital European single market 
• Shaping EU-China trade relations 
Precisely because the German economy is dependent on the 
international competitiveness of German industry and thus 
in particular on its innovative capacity, the government 
has in recent years bundled all research, technology and 
innovation policy measures in a high-tech strategy. The 
focus here is on key technologies, “which are of particu-
lar importance due to their economic leverage effect”, and 
five lead markets “with particularly great future potential”: 
Health, mobility, climate and resource protection, energy 
and environment, production technology and industry 4.0 
and new materials (BMBF 2018). 
Current industrial policy in Germany 
Currently, there seems to be a fundamental consensus  
of government, trade union and associations in Germany 
that a strategic overarching industrial policy can be a use-
ful instrument for strengthening Germany’s international 
competitiveness. This is all the more true in view of the  
situation already mentioned that important competitors, 
such as the USA or China, do not (any longer) play accord-
ing to internationally recognized rules, but try to establish  
special rules for themselves. For this reason, the current  
Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy, Peter Altmaier, 
explicitly advocates an active German and European indus-
History, aims and means
Historically, Germany has tended to be reluctant to actively 
pursue industrial policy and has exercised restraint in this 
respect. In the time of the economic miracle, the view had 
established itself that “the ‘free market order’ and func-
tioning competition should be the basis of all economic 
policy measures and instruments”, because “economic  
policy should essentially be ‘regulatory policy’ (Ordnungs-
politik)” (Gerlach and Ziegler 2015, p. 527). In practice, 
however, this guideline has not been consistently applied. 
Thus, time and again, individual sectors (e. g. hard coal 
mining) or even companies (e. g. BMW rescue at the begin-
ning of the 1960s) have been given special support (Gerlach  
and Ziegler 2015, p. 527). In the 1970s, with the end of the 
economic miracle and the emergence of new global com-
petitors such as Japan and later South Korea, the promo-
tion of high-tech sectors (e. g. IT and biotechnology) moved 
more into the foreground of industrial policy. Disruptions 
such as German reunification at the beginning of the 1990s 
and the financial and economic crisis of 2008/2009 clearly 
required industrial policy concepts that were not in line 
with “pure market theory”, e. g. the rescue of “industrial 
cores” in Eastern Germany or the “scrappage premium” to 
support the automotive industry in the wake of the finan-
cial crisis (Gerlach and Ziegler 2015, p. 527–528). 
A broader interest in industrial policy can be observed with 
the start of the grand coalition from 2013. An important  
indication of this is the Alliance for the Future of Industry, 
which was launched in 2014 by the BMWi, IG Metall and the 
BDI and to which 17 other partners have now joined (BMWi, 
n.d.). In this way, the Alliance brings together industrial 
and employer associations and trade unions. The aim is to 
strengthen Germany’s industrial competitiveness and to 
develop cross-industry and cross-interest approaches to 
this end. According to the Alliance’s understanding, indus-
trial policy will only be successful if it is not limited to 
individual sub-sectors and sectors (BMWi 2015). In order 
to develop concrete recommendations for action, there are 
a total of five working groups (WGs) that deal with the fol-
lowing questions (BMWi 2016; BMWi n. d.):
• WG 1: Acceptance – attractive industry: How do you 
reduce the existing prejudices against industry among 
the population and how do you communicate its impor-
tance for Germany’s prosperity? 
• WG 2: Investment-strong industry: How can the German 
framework conditions for private and public investment 
be improved?
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trial policy. Under his mandate, the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Affairs and Energy published the first draft of 
a National Industrial Strategy 2030 (BMWi 2019a) in Febru-
ary 2019. This led to a discussion process lasting several 
months, particularly between politicians, business, trade 
unions and academics. The results were incorporated into 
the revised version of the report published at the end of 
November 2019 Industrial Strategy 2030. This now provides 
for three central industrial policy fields of action (BMWi 
2019c): 
• Improve national and international framework  
conditions for the industry
• Activate innovation potential and strengthen key  
technologies
• Protect Germany’s technological sovereignty  
Compared to the previous version, a more sophisticated 
concept has now been published with the new BMWi indus-
trial strategy paper. There is no longer any direct reference 
to the targeted promotion of national and European cham-
pions. Instead – in addition to the usual support measures 
for technologies considered important and the strategic 
orientation in response to a globally tense trade situation – 
the importance of small and medium-sized enterprises is 
now also emphasized as a further core competence of the 
BMWi. Moreover, industrial policy is to become a priority  
of the German EU Council Presidency. In the further process  
it will be decisive how the implementation of the measures  
proposed for this purpose is designed in practice and to 
what extent these measures are sufficient to strengthen 
Germany’s international competitiveness vis-à-vis the  
USA and China. Considering the relevance of an economy's 
ability to innovate, an “active innovation potential” seems 
central to us.
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3 Innovation as a field of action  
for industrial policy
innovation (see Chapter 2), both models are characterized 
by major technological successes, such as the establish-
ment of the technology giants GAFA (Google, Apple, Face-
book and Amazon) and BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent). In 
contrast, Germany and the EU are in a period of upheaval. 
Recent contributions to the debate on industrial policy  
from politics, business and science point out that European  
and German policymakers face the task of developing and 
implementing strategies and measures to create their own 
sustainable and competitive innovation model (BMWi 
2019c; BDI 2019; SVR 2019). 
In the following we will first address the challenges  
facing the EU and Germany with regard to their innovative  
capacity. We then examine the American and Chinese  
innovation models with the aim of not only gaining a  
better understanding of the characteristics of both models,  
but, most importantly, to identify their success factors. 
With this background, we analyze in Chapter 4 whether  
and to what extent these success factors are at least par-
tially transferable to Germany and the EU or whether they 
can contribute to the development of German and European 
measures and strategies to promote innovation. 
3.1 EU and Germany: Declining innovative 
ability as a challenge
Productivity increases are an important prerequisite for 
long-term real economic growth (Galor 2005; Solow 1956). 
The standard measure of productivity, known as total factor 
productivity (TFP), is also an indicator of the technologi-
cal progress of economies. It describes which part of eco-
nomic growth is not attributable to an increase in capital 
stock and a higher number of employed persons. In short, 
it is a measure of the efficiency and degree of innovation in 
the economy. 
Chapter 2 has shown that the innovative capacity is  
central for industrial policy in the 21st century. The main 
reason for this is that in times of demographic change  
and digitization, technological innovations are becoming  
increasingly important for growth and prosperity. This  
is particularly true for Europe. Alternative levers for 
growth, such as the number of people in the labor force, 
will become less important in future due to demographic 
factors. At the same time, digitization and the disruption 
caused by new business models requires a constant process  
of innovation in order to survive in international competition 
in constantly changing markets. States and intergovern-
mental organizations have an important role to play here. 
They can intelligently set the framework for innovation 
processes and the growth of key technologies and industries  
so that synergies and market-driven products emerge – and  
the corresponding industries become self-sustaining in the 
long-term and generate economic and social returns. That 
is to say: Public action can stimulate new technologies and 
markets, which in turn contribute to prosperous economies 
in Europe. 
This is also the origin of the current debate in the EU on 
whether a new strategic industrial policy can be a response 
to the complex dynamics of digitization. Products of this 
political tendency are the new German Industrial Strategy  
2030 and the Franco-German Manifesto for a European Indus-
trial Policy for the 21st Century, both of which were presented 
in 2019. The focus here is on the question of how the EU 
and its member states can maintain their innovative and 
thus competitive strength in the face of the challenges 
posed by digitization. 
Certainly, there is no standard recipe for building and 
expanding the innovative capacity of an economy. Different  
countries rely on different strategies that can be equally 
successful. One important difference, however, is the role  
of the state. Examples of this difference are the innovation 
models of China and the USA. Although the two countries 
pursue industrial policy in very different ways to promote 
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a whole (BDI 2016). Nevertheless, technological progress 
has not been falling “like manna from heaven” for some 
time now.
International competition for patents and innovations
Europe’s weakness in innovation is also evident outside the 
economic indicators. For example, patent figures reflect 
the competitiveness of sectors, industries and ultimately 
the companies located within them. With information and 
communication technology (ICT) becoming increasingly 
important, a large number of new and rapidly growing 
companies have become active through patent applications. 
This is also evident from the patent applications filed under 
the European Patent Office (EPO). Among the top ten com-
panies with the most patent applications, the majority are 
no longer from the European Union – Figure 2 shows this 
finding. It appears that, particularly in the ICT market and 
closely related industries (such as smartphones, micropro-
cessors and semiconductors), EU companies are not at the 
forefront of patent applications. 
This observation is further supported by the current level  
of corporate R & D expenditure. Companies such as Sam-
sung invest about seven percent of their annual turnover in 
R & D. At least as important are American corporations such 
Figure 1 shows that the EU countries – measured in eco-
nomic terms – have lost innovative strength: TFP growth  
in the 1960s was just under three percent; today it is stag-
nating. Two other findings should be mentioned in this 
context. First, despite declining TFP growth, many coun-
tries are still recording GDP growth. This means that the 
source of economic growth is shifting more from inno-
vation to labor and capital stock factors. For example, 
in many countries the labor factor has been achieved by 
increasing the employment rate among women or by more 
immigration. 
However, these growth effects will only last in the short- 
and medium-term. In contrast, other economies show 
higher growth rates of technological progress. For exam-
ple, TFP growth in China averaged almost three per-
cent between 2011 and 2016, and as much as 3.5 percent in 
2017 – even if a catch-up effect is likely to play a role here. 
Europe’s declining and now also stagnating innovative 
capacity is thus accompanied by still quite robust growth  
in technological progress elsewhere. 
In Germany, the picture of TFP growth has been slightly 
better than in the EU in recent years, which may be due to 
a higher average industrial quota, since the propensity to 
innovate there is on average higher than in the economy as 
FIGURE 1: Total factor productivity growth
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Sources: Conference Board 2018; European Commission AMECO database 2019; own calculations.	
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as Google’s parent company Alphabet or Amazon, which, 
thanks to their financial strength, can also open up new 
business areas and industries that were previously foreign 
to them. 
Throughout Germany, private sector’s R & D expenditure 
accounted for 69 billion euros in 2017, for which the vehicle 
construction industry is primarily responsible with a share 
of almost two thirds (Stifterverband n. d.) – an industry in 
which company representatives see a risk of disruption of 
almost 90 percent (Staufen AG and Staufen Digital Neonex 
GmbH 2019). 
Weakness in growth industries
The patent applications within the EU shown above and  
the industry-specific concentration of R & D spending in 
Germany suggest that companies are not leaders in high-
tech markets such as 3D printing, artificial intelligence (AI) 
and semiconductors. This in turn could indicate that Europe 
has considerable growth potential in high-tech markets. 
Europe’s market growth in the industries of the future has 
been weaker in recent years than in other parts of the world 
(A. T. Kearney 2016). This finding is interesting for two rea-
sons. On the one hand, these industries are far from satu-
rated in Europe, so that the low growth rates are not a con-
sequence of high growth rates in the past. On the other 
hand, both developed economies (e. g. the USA and Canada) 
and emerging markets (e. g. in the Asia-Pacific and African 
regions) have growth rates almost twice as high.
These markets are becoming increasingly important in 
the context of the “networked industry”. However, as 
cross-sectional technologies, it is those future industries 
that have considerable potential for higher labor produc-
tivity of employees. More generally, productivity is a pre-
requisite for wage growth, notwithstanding the discussions 
on decoupling productivity and wage growth in some  
countries. The higher productivity gains in the past, the 
stronger the rise in wages (Kügler et al. 2018). Hence, in 
future industries like those mentioned above, companies 
do not only have potential to catch up, but stronger market 
growth can also have a positive effect on the labor market. 
Lack of risk capital and start-up support
Despite intensive efforts to improve the start-up culture 
and to promote growth companies more strongly, the  
EU countries still lag far behind the activities in the USA, 
Canada, Israel or South Korea. Figure 3 illustrates this  
fact. Israel, the US and Canada have the highest level of 
risk capital expenditure as a share of GDP. In the first two 
countries, the share of expenditure in GDP is about 15 times 
FIGURE 2: Patent applications in Europe, 2018
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FIGURE 3: Venture capital by enterprise type as a share of GDP, 2017
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dependency ratio is significantly higher there than in  
the USA and China. Many workers, especially in the  
old EU member states, will soon retire. This leads to 
increasing pressure on the social system, for which more 
resources must then be made available. At the same time, 
the average age of the working population is increasing, 
and aging workforces are increasingly losing the capacity  
for innovation (Liang 2018; Kaniovski and Url 2019; Petersen 
and Steiner 2019).
In the EU as well as in Germany, the efficient allocation  
of talent is a further difficulty. People who are able to work 
often lack the skills required for a particular job in order to 
be able to fulfill them appropriately. The main reasons for 
this are the lack of attractive job opportunities and a lack 
of talent management. This in turn has a negative impact 
on the innovative capacity of companies. The shortage of 
skilled workers in the EU is thus a major obstacle to inno-
vation (Cedefop 2015).
Empirical evidence shows that Europe has a considerable 
amount of catching up to do in order to ensure future  
economic growth driven by innovation and productivity.  
In order to keep up with global competition in future  
markets, it will be crucial for EU countries to set the right 
course today. 
higher than in Germany. Also noteworthy is the still very 
high proportion of venture capital invested in start-ups  
(in Israel, about two thirds of total venture capital). Germany 
ranks only in the midfield; with the exception of Spain, the 
southern European countries hardly invest at all. Overall, 
it becomes clear that the EU countries still have enormous 
catch-up potential in this area. 
Skill shortages due to demographics and inefficient 
allocation of talent
Human capital is an important driver of innovation  
(Mariz-Pérez et al. 2012). Companies worldwide are 
faced with the challenge of finding suitable personnel for 
increasingly complex tasks. The shortage of skilled workers 
is not only a predominant topic in the media in Germany, 
but a global phenomenon with a number of country-spe-
cific causes. Specific challenges for the EU and Germany 
arise in particular from demographic change and less  
successful talent matching (Hays 2018). 
Figure 4 shows the age dependency ratio, measured  
as the population aged 65 and over as a share of the wor- 
king age population between 15 and 64 years. The demo-
graphic development expressed in this figure primarily 
poses a challenge for Germany and the EU, since the age  
FIGURE 4: Age dependency ratio 
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In view of the innovation-driven rise of the GAFA and BAT 
companies in the USA and China, it is worth taking a look 
at the innovation models of these two countries in order to 
find suggestions for the future industrial policy design of 
German and European innovation capability.
3.2 USA: Silicon Valley as the epitome  
of innovation
Although the high-tech boom, especially in Silicon Valley, 
is often perceived as a product of American market liberal-
ism, the innovative capacity of the USA is largely ensured 
by decentralized state support. 
The modern innovation landscape of the USA is a product  
of the Second World War (Block 2008). The technological  
progress of this period led the Allies to victory (e. g. the 
work of the Radio Research Laboratory) and showed that 
it was also the responsibility of the state to ensure the 
financing of R & D. In the post-war period, government 
support for scientific activities increased significantly.  
The war also strengthened cooperation between the uni- 
versities and the government and gave the military a 
broader role as a major and permanent supporter of basic 
and applied research (NSF 1994). The interest in science 
and innovation was institutionalized in American politics  
in 1945 with the proposal of Vannevar Bush, one of the 
most prominent engineers of the war. With his report  
“Science, The Endless Frontier” Bush presented the plan 
for future cooperation between research institutions and 
the state (Bush 1945). Five years after this plan was pre-
sented, the National Science Foundation (NSF) was estab-
lished. The NSF was regarded as a continuation of military 
research in peacetime and was run as a civil organization 
(NSF 1994). Almost 70 years after its founding, the NSF 
continues to promote science and engineering in the  
United States, particularly in the fields of computer science, 
biology, mathematics and physics. In 2018, the agency  
had a budget of 7.8 billion dollars, financed 1,800 colleges,  
universities and other research institutions and thus  
supported an estimated 386,000 people (NSF 2019). Major 
innovations, some of which have been funded by NSF, 
include QUALCOMM, Google, the iPhone and 3D printing 
(NSF 2019).
In addition, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) has made a significant contribution to the devel-
opment of the USA’s innovative capacity. This agency was 
founded in the middle of the Cold War, when the Soviet 
Union and the USA competed to be the first to place a  
satellite in space (DARPA 2019). In 1957, the Soviet Union 
won this competition with the launch of the Sputnik satel-
lite, which not only caused panic among politicians, but 
also called into question the entire innovation model of the 
USA. DARPA was the direct result of this shock in 1958. 
Mariana Mazzucato (2013) describes that DARPA was 
founded “[…] to give the USA technological superiority  
in different sectors, mainly (but not only) those related to 
technology”. Compared to the NSF, the role of the state 
in the DARPA authority goes beyond the funding of basic 
research: It also directs resources in strategic sectors and 
facilitates cooperation between public and private actors. 
DARPA currently has a budget of 3.1 billion dollars (DARPA 
2019). This budget is invested flexibly and locally in four 
core areas: Defense technology, big data, biotechnology and  
the expansion of technological capability (groundbreaking  
technology) (DARPA 2019). The authority distributes its 
resources between small projects of high-ranking engineers  
and scientists as well as start-up companies, established  
firms and industrial consortia (Block 2008). The DARPA 
model has led to major discoveries and technological 
advances since its foundation: Thanks to the agency, we 
now have the internet as well as GPS and voice recognition 
systems (DARPA 2019).
The support of the state has always been important in  
the USA. State agencies have the power to decide inde-
pendently on resources, cooperation possibilities, invest-
ments and projects. This type of innovation support ena-
bled the development of a wide range of new technologies 
that were cross-sectoral. Companies such as Apple and 
Google have benefited from this diversity and achieved 
their success by, among other things, integrating and 
transforming different technologies to meet consumer 
demand. 
The relationship between the state and the venture capital  
market has also been of particular importance for the 
development process of the GAFA economy (Klingler-Vidra 
2018). Silicon Valley would not have come about without 
the generous but deliberate regulation of the state. As  
early as the 1970s, the state facilitated access to venture 
“Despite the perception of the US as the epitome of private 
sector-led wealth creation, in reality it is the State that has 
been engaged on a massive scale in entrepreneurial risk 
taking to spur innovation.” (Mazzucato 2013)
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capital by introducing the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act, which enabled pension funds to invest in venture 
capital. In addition, capital gains tax was also reduced in 
the early 1970s and the Small Business Investment Act created  
new incentives for investing in high-growth start-ups. 
Therefore, in the success story of its innovation model and 
especially of the GAFA companies, the American govern-
ment not only played the role of the demand side, but also, 
according to Klingler-Vidra (2018), the roles of the finan-
cier, the regulator and the profit maker.  Box
Strengths and weaknesses of the decentralized US 
innovation landscape
Various innovation rankings and indices show: The USA  
is one of the most innovative countries in the world.  
In the Global Innovation Index of the World Intellectual  
Property Organization, INSEAD and Cornell University 
(WIPO 2019), the USA will rank third in 2019 behind  
Switzerland and Sweden. The Bloomberg Innovation Index 
puts the USA in 6th place – behind South Korea, Japan, 
Germany, Finland and Israel (Bloomberg 2019). The USA  
is particularly strong in research expenditure. Public and 
private research spending in 2017 totaled 511 billion US dol-
lars – more than in any other country in the world (WIPO 
2019).
According to Robert Atkinson (2014), the success of a 
national innovation system is understood as the interplay 
of all important political, economic and social factors that 
initiate innovation, transfer it to other contexts, develop it 
further or disseminate it. Those states, which manage to 
make all three sides of a “triangle of success” work well 
together, are the leaders: 
• on the corporate side, the skills, activities and cultural 
attitudes of the private sector
• on the regulatory side, commercial, fiscal or any other 
legislation that sets the framework for innovation 
• on the innovation policy side, strong political institutions 
that provide the necessary infrastructure and investment 
How does the USA manage this interaction? Which 
strengths, but also weaknesses are evident?
On the corporate side, the USA is characterized by a strong 
combination in the corporate structure: On the one hand, 
they have many small start-ups with the ability to bring 
new ideas to market quickly. In the past, the start-up sec-
tor has benefited greatly from its openness and attractive-
ness to immigrants: Of the 91 American start-ups valued 
at more than one billion dollars in October 2018 (unicorns), 
more than half were founded by immigrants (Anderson 
2018). On the other hand, the USA is home to many large 
global companies in the high-tech sector with the poten-
tial to scale new products quickly and globally. Nine of the 
ten largest high-tech companies in the world (measured 
by market capitalization) come from the USA (Bloomberg 
2019). In the ranking of the Boston Consulting Group, eight 
American companies are among the top ten most innova-
tive companies worldwide (Ringel et al. 2019). However, 
due to the outsourcing of many manufacturing processes 
abroad, these are showing increasing weakness in applied 
and process innovations in an international comparison  
(Adler 2018).
Key features of the American  
innovation model
The state as a consumer: A considerable part of the 
research demand in the USA comes from the state, which 
has contributed to the steady growth of the American  
technology market. 
The state as mediator: The US authorities have managed 
to promote cooperation and collaboration between the  
private sector and research institutions. They facilitate  
the exchange of information, resources and funding. 
Diversified investments in research and science:  
US investment is spread across many different sectors  
and levels of research. In this way, the state promotes  
innovation activities on a broad basis, not sector- or  
technology-specific. 
The state as provider of basic technologies: The US 
authorities have a particular interest in promoting basic 
research whose products are used for applied research or 
the development of advanced technologies by the private 
sector. 
Facilitating the framework conditions for new techno-
logical developments: The innovation market is a  
capital-intensive sector. By facilitating the framework  
conditions of the venture capital market, the State  
provided access to a larger pool of financial resources. 
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ner 2013). This opens up a wide range of opportunities for 
universities to enter into cooperation with local companies 
and thus form regional clusters with research parks and 
business incubators (not only in Silicon Valley, but also, for 
example, in the Research Triangle in North Carolina). This 
is one of the reasons why the first six places in Reuters’ 
ranking of the most innovative universities, i. e. the univer-
sities that are particularly strong in research and use their 
technologies to drive new markets and growth sectors, are 
all US universities; a total of 46 universities from the USA 
make it into the top hundred (Ewalt 2019). 
However, government support through tax incentives to 
finance innovation (e. g. deductibility of R & D expenditures)  
is rather low in the US (Stewart et al. 2012). In an OECD 
comparison, the United States is only in midfield here 
(OECD 2019). The expansion of trade barriers and the rather 
negative climate towards immigration under the govern-
ment of President Donald Trump are among the negative 
developments in the regulatory area. The cross-border flow 
of innovation is inhibited, and the talent pool in R & D is 
reduced (Flournoy and Chefitz 2019).
On the innovation policy side, the main issue is the active 
role of the state in promoting innovation. The important 
role in promoting key and promising basic technologies 
has already been discussed in the previous chapter. There 
are also a number of government programs to support the 
dissemination and adoption of new technologies. Just one 
example: For more than a century, the Ministry of Agricul-
ture has been supporting farmers with numerous measures 
to adopt new production technologies. In addition, since the 
1980s, Congress has introduced a number of bills to make it 
easier for research to be commercially exploited. For exam-
ple, the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act ensures 
that federal research institutions can more easily trans-
fer innovations to other institutions or companies (Atkin-
son 2014).
Compared to the private sector, public spending on R & D 
as a share of gross national product has fallen sharply in 
recent decades. While research expenditure in the 1950s 
was almost two percent, it has now fallen to around 
0.7 percent (NSB 2018). Moreover, the United States lacks 
a strong central actor to coordinate the various govern-
mental innovation initiatives. Formally, this task is best 
placed with the Office of Science and Technology Policy, which 
is located directly in the White House. However, the agency 
is equipped with insufficient powers and a budget that is 
too small for this task and has suffered a severe loss of 
importance under President Donald Trump, after leadership 
Furthermore, companies in the United States have a very 
large and well-organized capital market. In particular, they 
are founders and still international “market leaders” in the 
field of venture capital, which is important for financing 
investments. This is especially true given the large number 
of venture capital companies. However, the increasing ten-
dency not to focus on the long-term success of companies, 
but rather on the short-term dividend policy (shareholder 
value), is more of a weakness. Here, surveys show that 
American managers themselves estimate that this prioriti-
zation is at the expense of R & D spending – and thus also  
at the expense of innovation (Atkinson 2014). 
Finally, cultural factors are decisive for a successful cor-
porate landscape in the field of “innovation” (Mihet 2013). 
On the supply side, the United States is characterized by a 
greater willingness to take risks and innovate (yankee inge - 
nuity) and a more pronounced entrepreneur culture than 
many other countries. This also includes the willingness  
not to stigmatize failures but to recognize them as an 
important learning experience, or to introduce new infor-
mation technologies quickly and successfully into the 
organization (Atkinson 2014). On the demand side, the  
US benefits from consumers with low saving rates, high 
product demand and access to a large amount of informa-
tion on new products. In addition, American consumers 
often aim to be early adopters of new products (Bhidé 2009). 
On the regulatory side, the US basically offers a stable  
and transparent legal framework (in particular independ-
ent courts and democratic legislation), which creates the 
neces sary expectation certainty in the area of “innovation”. 
This applies in particular to the regulations in the area of 
“intellectual property”. However, regulations in the inno-
vation landscape in the USA are relatively restrained, so 
that they offer a lot of leeway (Atkinson 2014). This is  
how the USA makes it relatively easy for entrepreneurs  
to set up new companies compared to other countries.  
In the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Ranking, the USA 
occupies eighth place behind a number of much smaller 
economies (World Bank 2019c). Conversely, it is also  
comparatively easy to close down companies or lay off 
employees – both factors that make it easier for entrepre-
neurs to take the risk of starting up again and to react  
flexibly to changes in demand. 
The regulatory framework, which is not too tight, also  
has a positive impact on the higher education landscape. 
The state requirements – whether from the federal capital  
Washington, D.C., or from the individual states – are less 
pronounced here than in other developed countries (Wess-
25
Innovation as a field of action for industrial policy
positions remained vacant for months and the number of 
employees fell from 135 (under President Barack Obama)  
to 45 (Alemany 2017).
3.3 China’s “long march” from piracy to 
independent innovation
Since the beginning of the reform and opening policy at the 
end of the 1970s, the Chinese economic system has been 
undergoing a transformation from a communist planned 
economy to a socialist market economy. One focus is the 
development of indigenous technologies and “independent 
innovation” (zizhu chuangxin). 
The Chinese government has taken and continues to take 
an offensive role in the development process of the Chinese 
innovation landscape: To this end, the central government 
issues economic and political guidelines, which are imple-
mented by local governments with a certain degree of  
leeway. At the same time, they experiment with pilot  
projects to test new approaches (trial and error). If these 
are successful, they are incorporated into national policies 
(Heilmann 2008).  
As early as the 1980s, there were a number of programs 
ranging from financial support for R & D and cooperation 
between business and science to the creation of autono-
mous research institutions (Huang et al. 2004) (Table 1, 
p. 26). Since the 1990s, investment in R & D and the num-
ber of Chinese students and researchers abroad have also 
increased steadily. Both are examples of indirect channels 
of knowledge acquisition and transfer and are important 
foundations for the emergence of a National Innovation  
System (OECD 1997). 
The Chinese innovation landscape has also benefited from 
the, in some cases forced, transfer of technology from 
abroad. For example, cooperation between foreign and 
TABLE 1: Development of policy adjustments in the Chinese innovation system, 1978 – 2004
Period Policy actions target Policy actions
Reformation of Planning Practice 
(1978 – 1984)
Recover and develop the R & D 
system and integrate it into the 
planned economic practices
Rehabilitation and improvement of R & D institutions after the damage 
during Culture Revolution (1966 – 1976).
Integration of R & D activities into the 6th National Five-Year Plan  
(1980 – 1985).
Performing the S & T activities in 
the “Market” (1985 – 1991)
Establish the horizontal and 
regular connection between S & T 
sector and enterprises
Replace the former S & T funding method that is mainly through planned 
appropriation by the program projects competition mechanism.
Diminish the government grants to force the R & D institution to establish 
cooperation with industry.
Create a “Technology Market” to legitimize paid transactions for 
technology and set up the agencies to support the transactions.
Promote the autonomy of R & D institutions and mobility of the S & T 
Personnel.
Attempt merging the R & D institutions into enterprises.
Support the spin-off enterprises.
Bridging S & T activities closely 
to “Socialist Market Economy” 
(1992 – 1998)
Run non-basic research R & D 
institutions as run enterprises.
Endow the R & D institutions the comprehensive economic autonomy as 
the same hold by normal enterprises.
Encourage spin-off activities through promoting science park and 
incubators.
Continue the merging strategy.
Large Scale Transformation of 
R & D institutions (1999 – 2004)
Transform nearly all of the 
government owned R & D 
institutions.
Transform the R & D institutions into enterprises, non-profit organizations, 
intermediary organizations or merged them into universities.
Abbreviations: R & D: Research and development; S & T: Science and technology
Source: Huang et al. 2004.
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domestic companies in the form of joint ventures was an 
important strategy for promoting technology and innova-
tion. These partnerships were intended to make it easier for 
foreign companies to access the Chinese market and to pro-
vide Chinese companies with new know-how (yi shichang 
huan jishu) (Jungbluth 2015). However, the legal frame-
work for joint ventures favored Chinese companies with the 
aim of promoting the development of local technologies. In 
addition, the state protected certain sectors from foreign 
competitors by either restricting or even prohibiting market 
access for foreign companies (e. g. Great Firewall). The con-
scious protection of domestic companies therefore played  
an important role in the creation of innovations Made in China 
(Sohm et al. 2009). It also promoted the development of the 
Chinese tech companies Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (BAT), 
as they did not have to stand up to the overwhelming com-
petition of the GAFAs (Shen 2019).
A second important factor in the emergence of BAT compa-
nies was – as in the USA – the evolution of the venture  
capital market since the early 1990s (Ahlstrom et al. 2007). 
The transformation of the Chinese economic system has 
produced a rapidly growing private sector and increas-
ing private investment. Foreign direct investment also 
increased rapidly (Figure 5). However, regulatory and 
infrastructural adjustments were necessary to ensure that 
capital flows reached Chinese companies more easily. 
Therefore, in 2002 the Chinese government established the 
China Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (CVCA), 
which is intended to support the development of venture 
capital and private equity in China (CVCA n. d.). 
China’s rapid economic development since the early 1990s 
has directly and indirectly driven the development of the 
Chinese innovation landscape. In this way, over the last 
30 years, China has developed from a country where simple  
cheap products Made in China (e. g. flip-flops, T-shirts, 
jeans and sneakers) were produced to a produc tion location  
where more technology-intensive consumer goods (e. g. 
dishwashers, air conditioners and PCs) can be manufactured  
cost-effectively with acceptable quality. Some product  
categories, e. g. smartphones and tablets, are now even 
mainly produced in China. Nevertheless, China is still 
highly dependent on foreign technology, especially in the 
high-tech sector. For example, Apple products are not 
developed in China. The iPhone therefore says: “Designed 
by Apple in California. Assembled in China.” This also 
shows that not even all of the components, some of them 
technology-intensive, are manufactured in China, but that 
the iPhone is merely assembled there. This also applies to 
other high-tech products (Levinson 2018). In other words: 
China does not yet play a leading role in global value chains,  
but a subordinate one. However, the Chinese government is 
already in the process of changing this: The next step is for  
China to develop into a world-leading location for innovation  
and technology, especially in a number of key sectors such 
FIGURE 5: Foreign direct investment flows to China, 1990 – 2018, in million US dollars
Source: UNCTAD 2019b.	
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as aviation, robotics, environmental protection, transport 
and medicine (Jungbluth 2018). 
In addition to MIC2025, there are other industrial policy 
measures that are intended to contribute to this, such as 
the national Internet Plus initiative, also launched in 2015. 
This should pave the way for the digitalization of the  
Chinese economy, e. g. with regard to intelligent production 
(Smart Factory) or the Internet of Things (IoT). The initia-
tive covers a wide range of sectors, from the financial  
sector to health care, industrial production and agriculture  
(State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2015b). 
Similar to MIC2025, the aim behind this is to strengthen 
the innovative capacity of Chinese companies so that they 
can build up technological competitive advantages and thus 
sustainably strengthen their international competitiveness. 
Such large-scale national projects are flanked by a large 
number of local initiatives: government-funded start-up 
incubators, for example, extensive financial support for 
key industries such as robotics (Taplin 2016), science parks 
even in smaller cities and a whole range of support pro-
grams for young entrepreneurs and scientists, which are 
also helping to ensure that more and more Chinese engi-
neers, programmers and researchers return to their home 
country from the West (Weinland 2018).
The Chinese innovation model contains both centralized 
and decentralized elements and is characterized by a com-
plex interplay between central and local government, state 
and private companies as well as research institutions. 
Similar to the USA, the state plays a prominent role as 
regu lator and consumer. It also guarantees, where appro-
priate, protection for domestic companies against foreign 
competition so that they can develop internationally  
competitive innovation activities. Box
Strengths and weaknesses in China’s state-controlled 
innovation model
China’s economic and now also technological success  
continues to amaze European observers: Whether it is 
industrial policy or the environment, major infrastructure  
projects or innovation initiatives – the government and 
authorities in China have little or no need to consider elec-
toral cycles, lengthy legal proceedings to clarify state powers,  
and objections from the opposition or affected citizens. 
From this, some strengths can initially be deduced which 
also apply to the Chinese innovation model: The Chinese  
government is able and has the political will not only to 
Key features of the Chinese  
innovation model
Innovative ability as a core objective of the Chinese  
economic order: There is a fundamental interest of the 
state in supporting public and private institutions in 
the technology sector, as the promotion of science and 
research is a central component of Chinese economic  
policy.
Protection of Infant Industries: The limited access of  
foreign competitors to the Chinese market has played a 
special role in the development of Chinese technologies. 
The state allows and supports the growth and establish-
ment of national companies before they are ready to  
position themselves on the international market. 
Technology transfer: The regulatory framework for  
cooperation between foreign and Chinese companies as 
well as certain laws and bureaucratic processes facilitate 
access to foreign know-how. 
Facilitating the framework conditions for capital inflows 
from abroad: To achieve innovation and bring it to mar-
ket, a considerable amount of capital is required. By facili-
tating the framework conditions for foreign direct invest-
ment, the Chinese state provided access to a larger pool of 
financial resources. 
The state as a consumer: As in the USA, the Chinese state 
plays a decisive role in the demand for products and tech-
nologies. For example, it uses its market power to favor 
domestic brands and products in public procurement.
Pilot projects: From the outside, China often appears  
as a centrally governed state. However, in the past,  
local governments have had both some influence on the 
development of central guidelines and scope for their 
implementation. This was done through local pilot pro-
jects, which were transferred to the national level if suc-
cessful.
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formulate long-term strategies but also to implement 
them. These include industrial policy strategies such as 
MIC2025, which set targets over a period of more than 
30 years on how certain industries and technologies should 
develop and where the acquisition of foreign technology 
may be necessary. In addition, the Chinese government 
also has the financial means to do so. Both play an impor-
tant role in the development of new infrastructures, which 
is necessary for the implementation of innovations. These 
include a stable 5G network for intelligent production facil-
ities, area-wide fuel pumps for e-cars or urban planning 
compatible with autonomous driving. 
The role of the state as a regulator, financier and consumer  
is also strengthened by combining the possibility of long-
term governance with sufficient financial resources. In  
this way, the Chinese government can promote innovative  
technologies in a targeted manner and encourage compa-
nies to push these more strongly. The most recent example  
of this is the introduction of a sales quota for e-cars in 
the automotive industry (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
2017). The Chinese government has also made targeted 
use of its strengths in long-term planning, implementa-
tion and financing in the development of high-speed trains 
and the infrastructure required for them. The Medium and 
Long-Term Railway Plan, which was adopted in 2004 (with 
revisions in 2008 and 2016) and covers a period of up to 
15 years (Lawrence et al. 2019), played a central role in this. 
Moreover, such long-term support programs often favor 
domestic companies over foreign competitors. Many indus-
tries in China initially need this protection to be able to 
hold their own against more advanced competition until,  
in the best case, they have accumulated enough know-how 
to stand on their own two feet. In this way, the government 
is trying to ensure that independent innovation activities 
actually develop.
Another strength of the Chinese innovation model are the 
pilot projects which have proven their worth in many areas 
since the beginning of the reform and opening up process 
in China. On the one hand, there is a certain central organi-
zation of processes that coordinate, for example, mutual 
learning among the political, economic and scientific actors 
involved in innovation and its application. On the other 
hand, the local levels are decisive for the implementation 
of innovation policy and can take local needs and specifics 
into account (Huang et al. 2004).
Finally, market size combined with high competitive  
pressure is an important factor in the development of the  
Chinese innovation model. It can have a positive impact 
on the market introduction, adaptation and distribution of 
technology, since economies of scale can be achieved more 
quickly, and thus the incentive to bring innovations quickly 
to market maturity and to concrete application in practice  
can be higher than in small economies (Business Model 
Innovation Lab 2018; Duesterberg 2018). 
The strengths of the Chinese innovation model go in part 
hand in hand with China’s autocratic political system. This 
in turn results in significant weaknesses. These include the 
education system, which in large parts is still not designed 
to promote independent creativity and critical questioning,  
and the restrictions on the free flow of information – both 
essential factors for an innovative economy. This makes  
it more difficult to reduce China’s dependence on foreign  
technologies. In addition, there are ethical questions which 
have so far played a much smaller role in the Chinese 
research and innovation landscape than in the EU and Ger-
many, and which harbor considerable potential for social 
conflict (e. g. genetic research). 
A serious economic problem is the misallocation of capital 
and resources (Barwick et al. 2019). It is a systematic weak-
ness of the Chinese economy and also affects the innovation  
initiatives of the Chinese government. The robotics plan is a 
good example of this: Because China has identified automa-
tion as a key industry for a boost to innovation in the coun-
try, President Xi Jinping called for a “robot revolution” in 
2014 (Bland 2016). Shortly afterwards, several ministries 
agreed to increase the sale of domestically produced robots 
to 100,000 units by 2020. According to this plan, Chinese  
robot manufacturers and their customers will receive sub-
sidies, cheap loans, tax exemptions and free building land. 
In addition, local governments have been authorized in 
some cases to finance these and similar measures, e. g.  
the construction of robotics research centers, through risky 
off-balance-sheet financing vehicles (Tobe 2017). As a 
result, the politically driven “robot revolution” led to over-
capacity in production, waste of resources (e. g. unused 
robots) and a focus on quantity rather than quality. In 
addition, the “blind expansion” in the robotics industry  
has meant that Chinese companies have copied machines 
with low technology content instead of driving forward 
independent innovations (Taplin 2016).
In addition to the misallocation of resources described 
above, China’s industrial policy programs to promote tech-
nology and innovation can also cause discrimination and 
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distortion of competition – both between domestic and as 
well as between domestic and foreign companies. On the 
one hand, the question arises as to whether the support 
always reaches the most innovative domestic companies  
or whether it is not rather the politically best networked, 
i. e. often state-owned companies. On the other hand,  
discrimination against foreign companies often emerges: 
In a survey conducted by the EU Chamber of Commerce in 
China in 2018, 46 percent of all foreign companies surveyed 
said that regulatory hurdles and restrictions on market 
access hindered their business in China. Smaller companies 
are hit particularly hard. Fifty percent of them said that 
these obstacles would have taken them more than ten per-
cent of their annual sales in 2017 (European Union Chamber 
of Commerce in China 2018). 
However, the deliberate protection of certain sectors 
against foreign competition or their restrictions on market 
access, which have played an important role in the develop-
ment of the Chinese innovation model, is now increasingly 
reaching its limits. Foreign companies and governments  
are less and less willing to accept such distortions of  
competition. They are increasingly taking action to defend 
themselves (European Commission 2019). The most extreme 
example of this is currently the USA, which could cause 
considerable damage to China through the ongoing trade 
conflict. Of all things, one of the most important goals of 
the Chinese government – to make China a leading location 
for technology and innovation by 2049 – is being severely 
disrupted by this.
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4 Outlook: Strengthening innovation 
capacity through strategic industrial policy 
• Stagnating or declining innovative ability 
• Loss of competitiveness on technology markets
• Low growth in future markets 
• Lack of risk and seed capital
• Lack of qualified specialists  
Suggestions for the development of an innovation-pro-
moting industrial policy can be found in the US and China 
(Table 2). In this context, it is of central importance to 
avoid falling into the trap of either the trumped-up  
“defective industrial policy” or Chinese state-control. 
In general, a strategic European or German industrial  
policy must succeed in balancing the protection and pro-
motion of legitimate self-interests on the one hand and 
economically damaging protectionism and ill-considered 
state interventionism on the other. The so-called “mission  
orientation” can make a significant contribution here: 
Accordingly, industrial policy should serve to meet specific 
societal challenges (e. g. digitization, demographic change, 
climate change) and be coherently geared to these objec-
tives (SVR 2019, pp. 152-153). Furthermore, this strategic  
industrial policy is to be driven in parallel by different 
actors. It is a joint task of business and politics to facilitate  
a competitive business location where the state ensures 
good competition-promoting framework conditions and  
the private actors take the actions.
Taking these requirements into account, we consider the 
following five fields of action as particularly important for 
an innovation-promoting industrial policy in the EU and 
Germany: 
Globally, industrial policy is changing. This process takes 
place in an international context that is determined by  
two narratives: Protectionism and innovation. On the one 
hand, Trump’s protectionist rhetoric has brought a clear 
reorientation of structural policy towards the protection  
of national industries into the debate. This is evident not 
only in domestic American policy, but also in China’s reac-
tive policies in the course of the trade war with the USA  
as well as in the intentions of the new industrial strategies 
of Germany and the EU. On the other hand, China’s ambi-
tious future plans to become a leader in the fourth indus-
trial revolution have set off alarm bells in the West. With  
its economic growth in recent years, China has proven its  
future potential and is becoming increasingly important  
as a global competitor in the field of digitization and inno-
vation. Countries such as Germany, France and the USA  
feel threatened and are trying to maintain their position  
as technology and innovation leaders through new national 
strategies. 
Although both narratives are important for the future of 
German and European industrial policy, innovation is the 
main driver of future industrial policy measures and strate-
gies (see Chapter 3). The high degree of digitization and  
the increasing importance of AI and automation for the 
economy require that both general economic policy and 
concrete industrial policy measures focus on innovation 
and technology. Furthermore, this requires the considera-
tion of strategies in which the state no longer assumes the 
role of a silent observer.
The desire to maintain its own innovative and competitive 
capacity is a clear link between the industrial policy ambi-
tions of the USA, China and the EU or Germany. However, 
our analysis shows that Germany and the EU have some 
catching up to do in terms of an innovation-promoting 
industrial policy. In particular, we have identified five key 
factors that describe the weaknesses of the European and 
German innovation landscape: 
31
Outlook: Strengthening innovation capacity through strategic industrial policy
TABLE 2: Comparison of the deficits of the German and European innovation model with the success factors  
of American and Chinese industrial policy
USA China
General deficits in the EU  
and Germany
Successful measures and strategies
Stagnating or declining  
innovative ability 
The state as a consumer: A significant part of 
the research needs in the US are public, which 
has contributed to the steady growth of the US 
technology market. 
Innovative ability as a core objective of the 
economic order: There is a fundamental interest 
of the state in supporting public and private 
institutions in the technology sector, as the 
promotion of science and research is a central 
component of Chinese economic policy.
Loss of competitiveness  
in technology markets
The state as a mediator: The US authorities 
have managed to promote cooperation and 
collaboration between the private sector and 
research institutions. They facilitate the exchange of 
information, resources and funding.
The state as a consumer: As in the USA, the 
Chinese state plays a decisive role in the demand 
for products and technologies. For example, it uses 
its market power to favor domestic brands and 
products in public procurement.
Specific deficits in the EU  
and Germany
Successful measures and strategies
Low growth in future markets Diversified investments in research and science: 
US investment is spread across many different 
sectors and levels of research. In this way, the state 
promotes innovation activities on a broad basis, not 
sector- or technology-specific. 
The state as provider of basic technologies:  
The US authorities have a particular interest in 
promoting basic research whose products are 
used for applied research or the development of 
advanced technologies by the private sector. 
Pilot projects: From the outside, China often 
appears as a centrally governed state. However,  
in the past, local governments have had both some 
influence on the development of central guidelines 
and scope for their implementation. This was done 
through local pilot projects, which were transferred 
to the national level if successful.
Protection of Infant Industries: The limited access 
of foreign competitors to the Chinese market has 
played a special role in the development of Chinese 
technologies. The state allows and supports the 
growth and establishment of national companies 
before they are ready to position themselves on the 
international market. 
Lack of risk and seed capital Facilitating the framework conditions for new 
technological developments: The innovation 
market is a capital-intensive sector. By facilitating 
the framework conditions of the venture capital 
market, the State provided access to a larger pool of 
financial resources. 
Facilitating the framework conditions for capital 
inflows from abroad: To achieve innovation and 
bring it to market, a considerable amount of capital 
is required. By facilitating the framework conditions 
for foreign direct investment, the Chinese state 
provided access to a larger pool of financial 
resources. 
Lack of qualified specialists Migratory conditions: Facilitating migration 
processes for highly skilled migrants has in the  
past led to a larger pool of human capital.
Technology transfer: The regulatory frame- 
work for cooperation between foreign and  
Chinese companies facilitates access to foreign 
know-how.
Source: Own representation.
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➌	Expansion of cluster approaches at EU level
In many EU countries, including Germany, cluster policy  
has become an important instrument of innovation and 
regional promotion. This approach could also be thought 
of on a pan-European basis in order to better exploit the 
diverse advantages of the individual EU member states. 
So-called “EU-wide clusters of excellence” are a sensible 
step here: Groups of companies, small and medium-sized 
enterprises, start-ups and research institutions from vari-
ous sectors can be organized in clusters and thus the value 
chains can be integrated to increase productivity. In addi-
tion, clusters could also serve to make more use of pilot 
projects as an innovation approach and – if successful –  
to gradually expand them across the board.
➍	Thinking and strengthening cybersecurity at EU level
Efforts to increase innovation in the EU will undoubtedly 
lead to more digital and data-based business models.  
These – like the digital internal market – need not only  
a clear competitive framework but also a modern security  
architecture. In addition to Internet crime and industrial 
espionage, international terrorism and espionage by states 
make cybersecurity and cyberdefense urgently necessary. 
Both areas can be conceptually described as integrated 
security of software, hardware and data-based informa-
tion. However, it is clear that there is still a considerable 
need in EU countries. Germany, for example, is only in 24th 
place globally, Austria and Denmark are in 30th and 34th 
place. In general, a pan-European approach to cybersecu-
rity is needed.
➎	Uniform and fair conditions for competition
In order to meet the current challenges to European inno-
vation capacity, a level playing field is needed – both for 
competition between EU companies and between EU and 
non-EU companies. Particular care must be taken to ensure 
that small and medium-sized enterprises are not disadvan-
taged in favor of European champions. Furthermore,  
regulatory scope for pilot projects to test modern, even  
disruptive business models could be made possible in order 
to increase the chances of European companies to compete  
internationally. The need for reform is also evident in 
European state aid law, which has so far put EU companies 
at a disadvantage in financing the acquisition of high-tech 
companies compared with buyers from third countries who 
have access to state-subsidized funds. 
➊ Implementation of a long-term innovation strategy 
As a basis for this, strategic European value chains in key 
technologies could be defined and digitally networked via 
Internet of Things applications (e. g. smart health, cyber-
security, hydrogen, autonomous driving). A starting point 
in this respect is provided by the already existing measures 
to promote six Key Enabling Technologies (KETs) (e. g. nano-
technology or advanced production technologies), which  
lay the foundation for innovation in a large number of  
traditional and new industries (European Commission, 
n. d.). These KETs have a particularly high potential to 
stimulate future growth and innovation and to ensure  
competitiveness with the USA and China. 
For the targeted financing of innovations in key technolo-
gies could Horizon Europe, the successor program from  
Horizon 2020, as the largest research funding program in 
the world, set a decisive accent. Member states should 
increase or adjust their spending on key technologies in 
line with Horizon Europe. Government procurement that  
is more strongly oriented towards key technologies could 
also play an important role here (e. g. infrastructure plan-
ning).
For the concrete implementation of innovations in practice,  
it is also important to have a good interlocking of scientific 
and market perspectives. Here could play the European  
Institute of Innovation & Technology (EIT), which is part of 
Horizon 2020 / Horizon Europe an important role. In particu-
lar the EIT ICT Labs (now: EIT Digital) are a promising 
approach. Among other things, the laboratories, which were 
launched in 2010, are intended to better link education, 
research and marketability – by means of an “ecosystem” 
that will stabilize the use of ICT applications in the form  
of so-called “hotspots” in Europe.
➋	Expansion of venture capital
Effective support for innovation also involves the EU and  
its member states providing growth funds for venture  
capital and other vehicles to promote innovation-driven 
growth companies and new business models. While some 
progress has already been made in the area of start-up 
financing, there is still a clear lack of access to capital to 
bring an innovation to market and thus to practical appli-
cation (go to market).
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There is also potential for improving competitive conditions 
by harmonizing and simplifying EU-wide regulation: From 
a global perspective, Europe has high standards, for exam-
ple in the areas of occupational safety and data protection, 
taxes, duties and environmental protection. They make an 
important contribution to strengthening consumer sover-
eignty and must therefore be preserved. However, the past 
also shows that, for example, ICT standards, which are still 
not harmonized in Europe in every area, put many Euro-
pean companies at a competitive disadvantage compared 
to those in more integrated markets. The same standards 
would also make sense for infrastructure projects so that 
companies can tackle them on a Europe-wide basis. 
At the international level, it is recommended that the EU 
should have a single voice in the relevant organizations 
(e. g. OECD and WTO) in order to achieve globally applicable 
and uniform regulatory standards. European companies  
came under pressure in their home markets, not least 
because international providers, for example in the tele-
communications industry, had to deal with less regulation 
in their home markets and had more resources at their  
disposal to enter the European market. 
In addition to the above-mentioned fields of action, which 
are relevant both for the EU and for the individual mem-
ber states, industrial policy measures in the following three 
areas could be useful for Germany in particular:
➊	Improvement of framework conditions for research and 
development 
The social market economy and a strong middle class are 
and remain central pillars of the German economic system. 
At the same time, it is important to improve the conditions 
for more private investment in R & D. These include reducing 
bureaucratic hurdles, strengthening e-governance and  
promoting greater diversity among professionals. 
➋	Gearing the education and research system more 
strongly towards entrepreneurship and innovation 
Public research, especially in basic technologies, can be an 
important incubator for R & D in private companies. An even 
stronger networking of public research institutions with the 
private sector can contribute to this. A general strengthen-
ing of the start-up culture would also be desirable, as this 
is still relatively weak in Germany, especially in comparison 
to the USA, partly due to the widespread fear of failure. This 
could be remedied, for example, by extending programs for 
start-ups in schools and universities and by increasing the 
number of state scholarships.
Another particularly critical factor for the success of an 
innovation is its implementation in practice, i. e. market 
entry. Much depends on the extent to which the start-up 
culture is shaped by the urge to professionally prepare 
the start-up. There is also room for improvement here: 
For example, students of MINT subjects, but also of the 
humanities and social sciences, could receive supplemen-
tary business management training in order to achieve  
the necessary market orientation. Better training in so- 
called design thinking is also conceivable – a method that 
promotes problem solving through creative and unconven-
tional thinking. In addition, the patent application process  
could be simplified. Furthermore, the potential of the 
working population in the EU and Germany must be  
better exploited in order to make use of existing talent 
and adequately counteract a possible shortage of skilled 
workers. To achieve this, the labor supply side and the 
labor demand side would have to converge. Investments 
in talent management, attractive and challenging work-
ing conditions as well as more intensive cooperation with 
educational institutions are approaches to creating innova-
tion-friendly conditions and thus pursuing an appropriate 
industrial policy. 
➌	State as a pioneer and trailblazer in new technologies
The state has the advantage of being able to draw up  
long-term strategies and plans that go beyond the  
periods in which companies think. In the case of issues  
of macroeconomic importance, a consensus across party 
and departmental boundaries is conceivable, beyond the 
thinking in legislative periods. This is particularly neces-
sary for the successive implementation of a long-term 
strategy across different government coalitions. In light  
of this, state actors could initiate and control a debate 
within society as a whole, which deals with overarching 
issues, such as: Which technology could come next? What 
are its advantages and disadvantages? How does it possibly  
influence everyday life? Does it help society in the long-
term? 
It is important to clearly explain the advantages of new 
technologies and how they work or to have them explained 
by proven experts. This could help to reduce potential  
prejudices and fears that may exist, at least in parts of  
the population.
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Such a process and its results could help to define essential  
elements and objectives of a long-term strategy, e. g. in 
relation to the management of digitization. In addition, the 
state could play a pioneering role in application and imple-
mentation (e. g. by rapidly expanding the digital infrastruc-
ture and – as already mentioned – e-governance or by 
increasing the promotion of e-business).
The fields of state action mentioned here indicate that a 
“night watchman state” is insufficient to sustainably pro-
mote innovations and key technologies. To this end, a 
long-term, coherent industrial policy at EU level and in the 
member states is both sensible and necessary. The findings 
and possible solutions presented in this paper are intended 
to make a constructive contribution to the development 
process of such a policy.
35
Appendix
Appendix
SVR German Council of Economic Experts 
(Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung  
der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung)
TFP Total Factor Productivity 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development
USBLS United States Bureau of Labor Statistics
WG Working Group
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO World Trade Organization 
Figures
FIGURE 1: Total factor productivity growth 18
FIGURE 2: Patent applications in Europe, 2018 19
FIGURE 3: Venture capital by enterprise type  
as a share of GDP, 2017 20
FIGURE 4: Age dependency ratio 21
FIGURE 5: Foreign direct investment flows to  
China, 1990-2018 26
Tables
TABLE 1:  Development of policy adjustments in the  
Chinese innovation system, 1978-2004 25
TABLE 2:  Comparison of the deficits of the German  
and European innovation model with  
the success factors of American and  
Chinese industrial policy 31
Abbreviations
AI Artificial Intelligence
AMECO Annual Macro-Economic Database of the 
European Commission
BAT Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent
BDI Federation of German Industries 
(Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie)
BMBF Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
(Bundesministerium für Bildung und 
Forschung)
BMWi Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft  
und Energie)
COM European Commission
CVCA China Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Association
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
EIT European Institute of Innovation & Technology 
EPO European Patent Office 
GAFA Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GED Global Economic Dynamics Project
GPS Global Positioning System
ICT Information and Communications Technology
IoT Internet of Things
KET Key Enabling Technology
MERICS Mercator Institute for China Studies
MIC2025 Made in China 2025
MINT Mathematics, Informatics, Natural Sciences  
and Technology
MLTRP Medium- and Long-Term Railway Plan 
NBS National Bureau of Statistics of China
NSB National Science Board
NSF National Science Foundation
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation  
and Development
R & D Research and Development
RMB Renminbi
S & T Science and Technology 
36
Learning from Trump and Xi? 
Literature
Adler, David (2018). “The American Way of Innovation  
and Its Deficiencies”. American Affairs (2) 2.  
https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/05/the-
american-way-of-innovation-and-its-deficiencies/
Aghion, Philippe; Boulanger, Julian; Cohen, Elie (2011). 
“Rethinking Industrial Policy”. Bruegel Policy Brief 
2011/04, Brussels. https://bruegel.org/wp-content/
uploads/imported/publications/pb_2011-04__final.pdf 
Ahlstrom, David; Bruton, Garry D.; Yeh, Kuang p. (2007). 
“Venture Capital in China: Past, Present, and Future”. 
Asia Pacific Journal of Management (24) 3, 247–268.
Aiginger, Karl (2019). “Industriepolitik mit 
gesellschaftlichen Zielen verbinden – systemischer 
Ansatz statt Uraltkontroverse”. Wirtschaftsdienst (99) 2, 
101–105.
Alemany, Jacqueline (2017, November 21). “Donald Trump’s 
Science Office is a Ghost Town”. CBS News. https://www.
cbsnews.com/news/donald-trumps-science-office-is-
a-ghost-town/
AMECO (2019). “AMECO – Capital Stock”. Annual Macro-
Economic Database of the European Commission.  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/
ameco/documents/ameco8.zip 
Anderson, Stuart (2018). “Immigrants and Billion-Dollar 
Companies”. National Foundation for American 
Policy, Arlington. https://nfap.com/wp-content/
uploads/2019/01/2018-BILLION-DOLLAR-STARTUPS.
NFAP-Policy-Brief.2018-1.pdf 
A. T. Kearney (2016). “Rebooting Europe’s High-Tech Industry. 
With the right measures in place, Europe Can Build a Vibrant 
High-Tech Sector to Boost its Economy”. https://www.
atkearney.com/communications-media-technology/
article?/a/rebooting-europes-high-tech-industry
Atkinson, Robert D. (2014). “Understanding the U.S.  
National Innovation System”. The Information Techno- 
logy & Innovation Foundation, Washington, D. C.  
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321790571 
Bardt, Hubertus (2019). “Ordnungspolitik ohne industrie-
politische Blindheit”. Wirtschaftsdienst (99) 2, 87-91.
Barwick, Panle J.; Kalouptsidi, Myrto; Bin Zahur; Nahim 
(2019). “China’s Industrial Policy: An Empirical Evaluation”. 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
No. 26075. https://www.nber.org/papers/w26075 
BDI (2016). “Produktivitätswachstum in Deutschland. Wege aus 
der Sackgasse”. Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie. 
https://english.bdi.eu/media/user_upload/20161104_
Industriepolitik_Dossier_Produktivitaetswachstum_in_
Deutschland.pdf
BDI (2019). “Deutsche Industriepolitik. Zum Entwurf der 
Nationalen Industriestrategie 2030”. Bundesverband der 
Deutschen Industrie. https://bdi.eu/publikation/news/
deutsche-industriepolitik/ 
Bhidé, Amar (2009). “The Venturesome Economy: How 
Innovation Sustains Prosperity in a More Connected 
World”. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 21 (1), 8–23.
Bland, Ben (2016, June 6). “China’s Robot Revolution”. 
Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/1dbd8c60-
0cc6-11e6-ad80-67655613c2d6
Block, Fred (2008). “Swimming Against the Current:  
The Rise of a Hidden Developmental State in the United 
States”. Politics & Society 36 (2), 169–206.
Block, Fred L.; Keller, Matthew R. (2011). State of Innovation. 
The US Government’s Role in Technology Development. 
Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
Bloomberg (2019). “The Bloomberg Innovation Index”.  
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-innovative-
countries/
BMBF (2018). “Bundesbericht Forschung und Innovation 
2018. Forschungs- und innovationspolitische Ziele und 
Maßnahmen”. Bundesministerium für Bildung und 
Forschung. https://www.bmbf.de/upload_filestore/pub/
Bufi_2018_Hauptband.pdf
BMWi (2015). “Bündnis Zukunft der Industrie.  
Gemein same Erklärung”. Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft und Energie. https://www.bmwi.de/
Redaktion/DE/Downloads/B/buendnis-zukunft-
der-industrie-gemeinsame-erklaerung.pdf?__
blob=publicationFile&v=3 
BMWi (2016). “Gemeinsam die Industrie stärken. Das Bündnis 
‘Zukunft der Industrie”. Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 
und Energie. https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/
Publikationen/Industrie/gemeinsam-die-industrie-
staerken.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=11 
BMWi (2019a). “National Industrial Strategy 2030. Strategic  
Guidelines for a German and European Industrial Policy”. 
Ed. Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie. 
Berlin, February. https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/
EN/Publikationen/Industry/national-industry-
strategy-2030.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=9
BMWi (2019b). “Industrial Strategy 2030. Guidelines 
for a German and European Industrial Policy”. Ed. 
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie. 
Berlin, November. https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/
EN/Publikationen/Industry/industrial-strategy-2030.
pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=7 
BMWi (2019c). “Moderne Industriepolitik”.  
Bundes ministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie.  
https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Dossier/moderne-
industriepolitik.html
37
Appendix
BMWi (2019d). “A Franco-German Manifesto for a  
European Industrial Policy Fit for the 21st Century”. 
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie.  
https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/F/
franco-german-manifesto-for-a-european-industrial-
policy.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2
BMWi (n. d.) “Gemeinsam die Industrie stärken”. 
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie.  
https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Dossier/buendnis-
zukunft-industrie.html 
Bush, Vannevar (1945). “Science the Endless Frontier”. 
Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing 
Office.
Business Model Innovation Lab (2018, January 26). 
“Business Model Creation and Innovation in China: Not just 
Copycats”. https://bmilab.com/blog/2018/1/26/business-
model-creation-and-innovation-in-china-not-just-
copycats 
Cedefop (2015). Skill Shortages and Gaps in European 
Enterprises: Striking a Balance between Vocational Education 
and Training and the Labour Market. Luxembourg: 
Publications Office. 
COM (2005). “Communication from the Commission. 
Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme: A Policy 
Framework to Strengthen EU Manufacturing - towards a 
More Integrated Approach for Industrial Policy”. European 
Commission. 474. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0474:FIN:EN:PDF 
COM (2007). “Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. 
Mid-term Review of Industrial Policy – A Contribution to the 
EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy”. European Commission. 
374. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0374&from=EN 
COM (2008a). “Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. On 
the Sustainable Consumption and Production and Sustainable 
Industrial Policy Action Plan”. European Commission. 397. 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
COM:2008:0397:FIN:en:PDF 
COM (2008b). “Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council. The Raw Materials 
Initiative - Meeting our Critical Needs for Growth and Jobs 
in Europe”. European Commission. 699. https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:069
9:FIN:EN:PDF 
COM (2009). “Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. 
Preparing for our future: Developing a common strategy 
for key enabling technologies in the EU”. European 
Commission. 512. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0512:FIN:EN:PDF 
COM (2010a). “Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. 
Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative Innovation Union”. 
European Commission. 546. https://ec.europa.eu/
research/innovation-union/pdf/innovation-union-
communication_en.pdf 
COM (2010b). “Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.  
A Digital Agenda for Europe”. European Commission. 245. 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
COM:2010:0245:FIN:EN:PDF 
COM (2010c). “Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.  
An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation  
Era – Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at  
Centre Stage”. European Commission. 614.  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0614&from=EN 
COM (2010d). “Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.  
An Agenda for New Skills and Jobs: A European Contribution 
towards Full Employment”. European Commission. 682. 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
COM:2010:0682:FIN:EN:PDF 
COM (2011). “Communication from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Indus-
trial Policy: Reinforcing Competitiveness”. European Com-
mission. 642. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0642&from=EN 
COM (2012). “Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions. A Stronger European Industry for Growth 
and Economic Recovery”. European Commission. 582. 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0582&from=EN 
COM (2014). “Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. For a 
European Industrial Renaissance”. European Commission. 14.  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0014&from=EN 
38
Learning from Trump and Xi? 
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China (2018). 
“European Business in China. Business Confidence Survey 
2019”. https://static.europeanchamber.com.cn/
upload/documents/documents/Business_Confidence_
Survey_2019_updated[663].pdf 
Ewalt, David M. (2019). “The World’s Most Innovative 
Universities 2019”. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/
innovative-universities-2019
Export-Import Bank of the United States (2018). 
“2017 Annual Report”. https://www.exim.
gov/sites/default/files/reports/annual/2017/
MasterEXIM2017AnnualReportSpreads_2.6.18.pdf
Flournoy, Michèle; Chefitz, Gabrielle (2019). “Here’s  
How the United States Can Keep Its Technological Edge”.  
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/25/heres-how-the-
united-states-can-keep-its-technological-edge-trump/
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2017, September 28).  
“Die E-Auto-Quote in China kommt”. https://www.faz.net/
aktuell/wirtschaft/unternehmen/elektroautos-china-
fuehrt-die-elektroquote-ab-2019-ein-15222043.html 
Gabler (1988). Gabler Wirtschafts-Lexikon. 12th completely 
revised and expanded edition. Wiesbaden: Springer 
Fachmedien. 
Galor, Oded (2005). “From Stagnation to Growth:  
Unified Growth Theory”. Handbook of Economic Growth 
(1), 171–293.
Gerlach, Frank; Ziegler, Astrid (2015). “Konturen einer 
proaktiven Industriepolitik – Das Beispiel Deutschland”. 
WSI-Mitteilungen 68 (7), 526–533.
Gorning, Martin (2012, February 21). “Moderne Industrie-
nationen brauchen eine aktive Industriepolitik”. Gegen-
blende. https://gegenblende.dgb.de/++co++977c5034-
5c96-11e1-4350-001ec9b03e44
Hall, Peter A.; Soskice, David (2001). Varieties of Capitalism. 
The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Handelsblatt (2012, June 9). “Industriepolitik: Die Rückkehr 
des Staates”. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/
konjunktur/oekonomie/nachrichten/industriepolitik-
die-rueckkehr-des-staates/6709438.html
Hays (2018). “Investing in the Skills of Tomorrow. Avoiding 
a Spiralling Skills Crisis”. The Hays Global Skills Index 
2018. https://www.hays-index.com/wp-content/
uploads/2018/09/Hays-Global-Skills-Index-2018-
Report.pdf
Heilmann, Sebastian (2008). “From Local Experiments 
to National Policy – The Origins of China’s Distinctive 
Policy Process”. The China Journal (59), 1–30.
Heilmann, Sebastian; Shih, Lea (2013). “The Rise of 
Industrial Policy in China, 1978-2012”. Harvard-Yenching 
Institute Working Paper Series, Trier. https://www.
Conference Board (2018). “Total Economy Database – 
Archive”. https://www.conference-board.org/data/
economydatabase/index.cfm?id=30565
CVCA (n. d.). “CVCA Profile”. China Venture and Private 
Equity Association. http://www.cvca.org.cn/aboutcvca/
profile.asp
DARPA (2019). “Selected History of DARPA Innovation”. 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.  
https://www.darpa.mil/Timeline/index.html
Dohse, Dirk; Felbermayr, Gabriel; Görg, Holger; Kooths, 
Stefan; Lechthaler, Wolfgang; Trebesch, Christoph 
(2019). “Zeit für eine neue Industriepolitik?”. Institut  
für Weltwirtschaft, Policy Brief Nr. 122, Kiel.  
https://www.ifw-kiel.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/
IfW-Publications/-ifw/Kiel_Policy_Brief/Kiel_Policy_
Brief_122.pdf 
Donges, Juergen B. (2005). “Industrie- und technolo- 
giepolitischer Aktivismus: ökonomisch fragwürdig”.  
ifo Schnelldienst (58) 22, 3–11.
Duesterberg, Thomas J. (2018). “Chinas Herausforderung 
in Wirtschaft und Handel an den Westen: Aussichten und 
Perspektiven aus amerikanisch-deutscher Sicht”. Hudson 
Institute, Washington, D. C. https://www.kas.de/c/
document_library/get_file?uuid=12eff37d-c72c-8431-
078f-9ce11500ee40&groupId=252038
EC-Treaty (1997). “Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
on European Union”. Official Journal of the European 
Communities. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:1997:340:FULL&from=EN 
EPO (2019). “Annual Report 2018. Applicants”. European 
Patent Office. https://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-
reports-statistics/annual-report/2018/statistics/
applicants.html#tab1 
European Commission (2017). “New Industrial Policy 
Strategy”. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/new-
industrial-policy-strategy-2017-sep-18_en 
European Commission (2019). “EU-China – A Strategic 
Outlook”. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-
outlook.pdf 
European Commission (o. J.). “What are KETs and Why Are 
they Important?”. https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/
policy/key-enabling-technologies/description_en
European Parliament (2019). “General Principles of EU 
Industrial Policy”. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/
en/FTU_2.4.1.pdf 
European Parliament (2000). “Lisbon European Council  
23 and 24 March 2000. Presidency Conclusions”.  
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm
39
Appendix
harvard-yenching.org/sites/harvard-yenching.org/files/
featurefiles/Sebastian%20Heilmann%20and%20Lea%20
Shih_The%20Rise%20of%20Industrial%20Policy%20
in%20China%201978-2012.pdf
Horsley, Scott (2018, November 27). “Trump Administra-
tion Threatens to Withhold Subsidies from GM”.  
National Public Radio. https://www.npr.org/2018/11/ 
27/671231681/trump-administration-threat-
ens-to-withhold-subsidies-from-gm?t=1548205069963 
Huang, Can; Amorim, Celeste; Spinoglio, Mark; Gouveia, 
Borges; Medina, Augusto (2004). “Organization, Pro-
gram and Structure: Analysis of the Chinese Innovation 
Policy Framework”. R&D Management (34) 4, 367–387.
Huffschmid, Jörg (2005). “Wozu brauchen wir eine neue 
Industriepolitik?”. Technikfolgeabschätzung – Theorie und 
Praxis 14 (1), 42–50.
Jiang, Feitao; Li, Xiaoping (2018). “Progress and Develop-
ment of Chines Industrial Policy in 40 Years of Reforms 
and Opening” [in Chinese]. World of Management 
(10). http://gjs.cssn.cn/kydt/kydt_kycg/201811/
t20181114_4775717.shtml
Jungbluth, Cora (2015). Going Global – Die internationale 
Expansion chinesischer Unternehmen. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos.
Jungbluth, Cora (2017). “Trump & Brexit – European 
Asian Economic Relations under New Conditions”. Ed. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung. GED Focus Paper. Gütersloh. 
https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/
BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/NW_Trump___
Brexit.pdf 
Jungbluth, Cora (2018). “Kauft China systematisch 
Schlüsseltechnologien auf? Chinesische Firmenbeteiligungen 
in Deutschland im Kontext von ‘Made in China 2025’”.  
Ed. Bertelsmann Stiftung. GED Study. Gütersloh.  
https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/
BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/MT_Made_in_
China_2025.pdf
Jungbluth, Cora (2019). “Standortattraktivität vs. 
Interessen wahrung: Deutschlands Dilemma im Umgang 
mit ausländischen Direktinvestitionen (ADI)”. Zeitschrift 
für Wirtschaftspolitik (68) 1, 36–44.
Kaniovski, Sergui; Url, Thomas (2019). “Macroeconomic 
Consequences of Ageing and Directed Technological 
Change”. Ed. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh. 
https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/
files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/
MacroeconomicConsequences_2019_FINAL2.pdf
Klingler-Vidra, Robyn (2018). The Venture Capital State:  
The Silicon Valley Model in East Asia. New York, NY:  
Cornell University Press. 
Klodt, Henning (2018). “Industriepolitik”. Gabler 
Wirtschaftslexikon. https://wirtschaftslexikon.gabler.de/
definition/industriepolitik-38913/version-262334 
Kügler, Alice; Schönberg, Uta; Schreiner, Ranghild 
(2018). “Productivity Growth, Wage Growth and Unions”. 
European Central Bank. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/
conferences/shared/pdf/20180618_ecb_forum_on_
central_banking/Schoenberg_Uta_Paper.pdf 
Lane, Nathaniel (2019). “The New Empirics of Industrial 
Policy”. Monash University. http://nathanlane.info/
assets/papers/NathanLane_New_Empirics_of_
Industrial_Policy_current.pdf
Lawder, David; Blanchard, Ben (2018, June 15). “Trump 
Sets Tariffs on $50 Billion in Chinese Goods; Beijing 
Strikes Back”. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-trade-china-ministry/trump-sets-tariffs-on-
50-billion-in-chinese-goods-beijing-strikes-back-
idUSKBN1JB0KC
Lawrence, Martha; Bullock, Richard; Liu, Ziming (2019). 
China’s High-Speed Rail Development. International 
Development in Focus. Washington, D. C.: World Bank 
Publications.
Levinson, Marc (2018, February 21). “U.S. Manufacturing in 
International Perspective”. Congressional Research Service. 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42135.pdf 
Liang, James (2018). The Demographics of Innovation:  
Why Demographics is a Key to the Innovation Race. 
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
Manager Magazin (2019, May 6). “Altmaier muss sich viel 
Kritik anhören”. https://www.manager-magazin.de/
politik/deutschland/peter-altmaier-industriestrategie-
2030-viel-kritik-an-der-bundesregierung-a-1265961.
html 
Mariz-Pérez, Rosa M.; Teijeiro-Alvarez, M. Mercedes; 
Garcìa-Alvarez, M. Teresa (2012). “The Relevance of 
Human Capital as a Driver for Innovation”. Cuadernos  
de Economia (35) 98, 68–76.
Mazzucato, Mariana (2013). The Entrepreneurial State. 
Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths. New York, NY: 
Anthem Press.
Meissner, Mirjam (2016). “Industriepolitik, Investitions- 
kataloge und öffentliche Beschaffung: Automobil- 
industrie”. Das politische System der Volksrepublik China. 
Ed. Heilmann, Sebastian. Berlin: Springer. 346–351.
MERICS (2017). “MERICS China Update”. Mercator Institute 
for China Studies. https://www.merics.org/sites/default/
files/2018-01/MERICS_China_Update_17_2017_DE_0.
pdf 
Mihet, Roxana (2013). “Effects of Culture on Firm Risk-
Taking: A Cross-Country and Cross-Industry Analysis”. 
Journal of Cultural Economics 37 (1), 109–151.
40
Learning from Trump and Xi? 
Naughton, Barry (2018). “Xi’s System, Xi’s Men: After the 
March 2018 National People’s Congress”. Hoover Institution 
China Leadership Monitor 56, Stanford. https://www.
hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/
spring-2018-issue-56
Navarro, Peter (2018, October 10). “Team Trump Is 
Protecting America’s Vital Manufacturing, Defense 
Industrial Base from Big Risks”. Fox News. https://
www.foxnews.com/opinion/trump-administration-
is-protecting-americas-vital-manufacturing-and-
defense-industrial-base-from-big-risks
NBS (2018). “China Statistical Yearbook. Section 1.2: Principal 
Aggregate Indicators on National Economic and Social 
Development and Growth Rates” [in Chinese]. National 
Bureau of Statistics of China. http://www.stats.gov.cn/
tjsj/ndsj/2018/indexch.htm
NSB (2018). “Science and Engineering Indicators 2018. Recent 
Trends in U.S. R  &  D Performance”. National Science Board. 
https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/report/
sections/research-and-development-u-s-trends-and-
international-comparisons/recent-trends-in-u-s-r-d-
performance
NSF (1994). “The National Science Foundation: A Brief History”. 
National Science Foundation. https://www.nsf.gov/
about/history/nsf50/nsf8816.jsp
NSF (2019). “FY 2020 Budget Request to Congress”. National 
Science Foundation. https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2019/
nsf19005/nsf19005.pdf
Oberender, Peter; Ruckdäschel, Stephan; Rudolf, Thomas 
(2013). “Industriepolitik”. Lexikon Soziale Marktwirtschaft 
– Wirtschaftspolitik von A–Z. Ed. Haase, Rolf H.; Schnei- 
der, Hermann; Weigelt, Klaus. Sankt Augustin/Berlin: 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
OECD (1997). “National Innovation Systems”. Organisation  
for Economic Co-operation and Development.  
https://www.oecd.org/science/inno/2101733.pdf
OECD (2018). “Venture Capital Investments”. Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. https://stats.
oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=VC_INVEST 
OECD (2019). “Measuring Tax Support for R  &  D and Innovation”. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop- 
ment. https://www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats.htm
Partington, Richard (2018, August 30). “NAFTA: What is it 
and Why is Trump Trying to Renegotiate?”. The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/aug/30/
nafta-what-is-it-why-is-trump-trying-to-renegotiate 
Petersen, Thieß (2015). “Deutschlands Exportüberschüsse – 
Fluch oder Segen?”. Ed. Bertelsmann Stiftung. GED Focus 
Paper. Gütersloh. https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/
fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/
NW_D_Exportueberschuss_2015.pdf 
Petersen, Thieß; Jungbluth, Cora (2018). “In einer 
veränderten Weltwirtschaft”. Soziale Marktwirtschaft 
weiter denken – Bausteine für eine zukunftsfähige Wirt- 
schafts- und Gesellschaftsordnung. Ed. Bertelsmann Stif- 
tung. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung. 139-157.
Petersen, Thieß (2019, January 18). “World Economic 
Outlook 2019. Growth in Times of Political Uncertainty”. 
Global Economic Dynamics. https://ged-project.de/
allgemein-en/world-economic-outlook-2019
Petersen, Thieß; Steiner, Falk (2019). “Megatrend-Report #1: 
The Bigger Picture”. Ed. Bertelsmann Stiftung. Gütersloh. 
https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/
BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/Megatrend_
Report_1_MT_The_Bigger_Picture_2019.pdf
Pons-Benaiges, Oriol (2017). “Did Government Intervention 
Target Technological Externalities? Industrial Policy and 
Economic Growth in Postwar Japan, 1964-1983”. Stanford 
University. https://delong.typepad.com/06_tech_
externalities_japan.pdf 
Ramaswamy, Sree; Manyika, James; Pinkus, Gary; 
George, Katy; Law, Jonathan; Gabell, Tony; Serafino, 
Andrea (2017). “Making it in America: Revitalizing 
US Manufacturing”. McKinsey Global Institute. https://
www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20
insights/Americas/Making%20it%20in%20America%20
Revitalizing%20US%20manufacturing/Making-it-in-
America-Revitalizing-US-manufacturing-Full-report.
ashx 
Rehfeld, Dieter; Dankbaar, Ben (2015). “Industriepolitik. 
Theoretische Grundlagen, Varianten und Heraus-
forderungen”. WSI-Mitteilungen 68 (7), 491–499.
Ringel, Michael; Grassl, Florian; Baeza, Ramón; Kennedy, 
Derek; Manly, Justin (2019). “Innovation 2019. The Most 
Innovative Companies 2019”. Boston Consulting Group. 
https://www.bcg.com/de-de/publications/2019/most-
innovative-companies-innovation.aspx
Rodrik, Dani (2017, January 10). “Trump’s Defective 
Industrial Policy”. Project Syndicate. https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/trump-defective-industrial-
policy-by-dani-rodrik-2017-01?barrier=accesspaylog
Scheel, Kurt C. (2005). “Nationale Champions – aus eigener 
Kraft!”. ifo Schnelldienst (58) 22, 10–11.
Schrank, Andrew; Whitford, Josh (2009). “Industrial Policy 
in the United States. A Neo-Polanyian Interpretation”. 
Politics & Society (37) 4, 521–553.
Schwab, Klaus (2016). Die Vierte Industrielle Revolution. 
Munich: Pantheon Verlag.
41
Appendix
Shen, Hong (2019). “China’s Tech Giants: Baidu, Alibaba, 
Tencent”. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. https://www.kas.
de/documents/288143/4843367/Chinas+Tech+Giants.
pdf/35068fb8-4540-6ee2-73ce-2eb51a1e778b?version=1.
0&t=1556780607252
Slobodian, Quinn (2018, August 6). “You Live in  
Robert Lighthizer’s World Now”. Foreign Policy.  
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/06/you-live-in-
robert-lighthizers-world-now-trump-trade 
Sohm, Stefanie; Linke, Bernd M.; Klossek, A. (2009). 
“Chinesische Unternehmen in Deutschland. Chancen  
und Herausforderungen”. Bertelsmann Stiftung.  
https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/
files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/GP_
Chinesische_Unternehmen_in_Deutschland.pdf 
Solow, Robert M. (1956). “A Contribution to the Theory  
of Economic Growth”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
(70) 1, 65–94. 
Sperling, Gene (2013, July 25). “The Case for a Manu- 
facturing Renaissance”. The Brookings Institution.  
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2013/07/The-Case-for-a-Manufacturing-
RenaissanceGene-Sperling7252013FINALP.pdf
Stahl, Gerhard (2017, October 9). “Marriage of 
Convenience”. International Politics and Society.  
https://www.ips-journal.eu/regions/asia/article/show/
marriage-of-convenience-2340/ 
State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2015a). 
“Mitteilung des Staatsrats über die Verbreitung [of the 
documents regarding] ‘Made in China 2025’” [in Chinese]. 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-05/19/
content_9784.htm 
State Council of the People’s Republic of China 
(2015b). “China Unveils Internet Plus Action Plan to 
Fuel Growth”. http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_
releases/2015/07/04/content_281475140165588.htm 
Statistisches Bundesamt (2018a). Statistisches Jahrbuch 2018. 
Deutschland und Internationales. Wiesbaden: Statistisches 
Bundesamt.
Statistisches Bundesamt (2018b). “Bruttowertschöpfung: 
Produzierendes Gewerbe” [data record]. https://
www.destatis.de/Migration/DE/ZahlenFakten/
LaenderRegionen/Internationales/Thema/Tabellen/
Basistabelle_IndWertschoepfung.html?nn=81746 
Staufen AG and Staufen Digital Neonex GmbH (2019). 
“Erfolg im Wandel. Deutscher Change Readiness Index 2019”. 
https://www.staufen.ag/fileadmin/HQ/02-Company/05-
Media/2-Studies/Beratung_Studie__Change_
Readiness_2019_DT_DPS.pdf
Stensrud, Christian (2016). “Industrial Policy in the United 
States”. Civitas. https://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/
IndustrialpolicyintheUnitedStates.pdf 
Stephan, Matthias; Alsabah, Nabil (2017). “Die Partei 
auf Linie bringen. 19. Parteitag der KPC wird Xi Jinping 
stärken – und die Entwicklungsoptionen Chinas einengen”. 
MERICS China Monitor, Berlin. https://www.merics.
org/sites/default/files/2018-01/170831_Merics_China-
Monitor_41_DE_0.pdf 
Stewart, Luke A.; Warda, Jacek; Atkinson, Robert D. (2012). 
“We’re #27!: The United States Lags Far Behind in R & D 
Tax Incentive Generosity”. Information Technology & 
Innovation Foundation, Washington, D. C.  
http://www2.itif.org/2012-were-27-b-index-tax.pdf
Stifterverband (n. d.). “Forschung und Entwicklung”.  
https://www.stifterverband.org/fue-facts-2017 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2017). “Industrial Policy, Learning, 
and Development”. The Practice of Industrial Policy: 
Government–Business Coordination in Africa and East Asia. 
Ed. Page, John; Tarp, Finn. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 23-39.
SVR (2019). “Den Strukturwandel meistern”.Sach ver stän di-
gen rat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt. 
Taplin, Nathaniel (2016, August 3). “China’s Robotics Rush 
Shows how its Debt Can Get Out of Control”. Reuters. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-debt-
robotics-insight/chinas-robotics-rush-shows-how-its-
debt-can-get-out-of-control-idUSKCN10E0EV
TFEU (2012). “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union”.  
Official Journal of the European Union. https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12012E/
TXT:en:PDF 
The White House (2018). “Statement from the President”. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
statement-from-the-president-4/ 
Tobe, Frank (2017). “China’s Strategic Plan for a Robotic 
Future is Working: 500+ Chinese Robot Companies”.  
The Robotreport. https://www.therobotreport.com/
chinas-strategic-plan-for-a-robotic-future-is-
working-500-chinese-robot-companies/
UNCTAD (2018). “General Profile: China”. United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. https://
unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/
en-GB/156/index.html 
UNCTAD (2019a). “Gross Domestic product: GDP by Type of 
Expenditure. VA by Kind of Economic Activity, Total and 
Shares, Annual, 1970-2016”. United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development. http://unctadstat.unctad.org/
wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=95
42
Learning from Trump and Xi? 
UNCTAD (2019b). “World Investment Report. Annex table 1. 
FDI Inflows, by Region and Economy, 1990–2018”. United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development.  
https://unctad.org/Sections/dite_dir/docs/WIR2019/
WIR19_tab01.xlsx 
United States Interagency Task Force (2018). “Assessing  
and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial 
Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States.  
Report to President Donald J. Trump by the Interagency  
Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806”. 
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-
1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-STRENGTHENING-THE-
MANUFACTURING-AND-DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-
AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF 
USBLS (2017). “Employment by Major Industry Sector”. United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistics. https://www.bls.gov/
emp/tables/employment-by-major-industry-sector.htm
Wade, Robert (2014). “The Paradoy of US Industrial Policy: 
The Developmental State in Disguise”. Transforming 
Economies: Making Industrial Policies Work for Growth, Jobs 
and Development. Ed. Salazar-Xirinachs, José M.; Nübler, 
Irmgard; Kozul-Wright, Richard. Genf: International 
Labour Office. 379-400.
Weinland, Don (2018, February 11). “China in Push to Lute 
Overseas Tech Talent Back Home”. Financial Times. 
https://www.ft.com/content/84d27f6a-04bc-11e8-
9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5
Wessner, C.W. (2013). Best Practice in State and Regional 
Innovation Initiatives. Competing in the 21st Century. 
Washington, D. C.: National Academies Press. 
West, Darrell M.; Lansang, Christian (2018, July 10). “Global 
Manufacturing Scorecard: How the US Compares to 18 
Other Nations”. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/
research/global-manufacturing-scorecard-how-the-us-
compares-to-18-other-nations/ 
WIPO (2019). “Global Innovation Index 2019”. World 
Intellectual Property Organization. https://www.wipo.
int/publications/en/details.jsp?id=4434 
Wirtschaftswoche (2018, 17th May). “Der Staat ist ein 
schlechter Erfinder.” https://www.wiwo.de/politik/
deutschland/industriepolitik-der-staat-ist-ein-
schlechter-erfinder/21258732.html 
World Bank (2018). “Manufactures Exports (% of Merchandise 
Exports)”. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/tx.val.
manf.zs.un 
World Bank (2019a). “Industry (Including Construction), Value 
Added (% of GDP) – China”. https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NV.IND.TOTL.ZS?locations=CN 
World Bank (2019b). “Age Dependency Ratio, Old (% of 
Working-Age Population)”. https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SP.POP.DPND.OL 
World Bank (2019c). “Doing Business 2019. Training for 
Reform”. https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/
doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB2019-
report_web-version.pdf
43
Imprint
Imprint
© 2020 Bertelsmann Stiftung
Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256 
33311 Gütersloh 
Phone +49 5241 81-0 
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Responsible 
Dr. Cora Jungbluth 
Program Megatrends 
Bertelsmann Stiftung  
Phone +49 5241 81-81482 
cora.jungbluth@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Daniela Arregui Coka 
Program Megatrends 
Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Phone +49 5241 81-81226 
daniela.arregui.coka@ 
bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Markus Overdiek 
Program Megatrends 
Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Phone +49 5241 81-81854 
markus.overdiek@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Translation 
Heilwagen Übersetzung GmbH & Co. KG
Graphic Design 
Dietlind Ehlers, Bielefeld
Printing 
Gieselmann Druck und Medienhaus, 
Bielefeld
Cover picture 
© Gorodenkoff – stock.adobe.com
Address | Contact
Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256 
33311 Gütersloh 
Phone +49 5241 81-0
GED-Team
Program Megatrends
Phone +49 5241 81-81353
ged@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
www.ged-project.de
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
